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INTRODUCTION
"I would like to think that my term as Chairmar will be perceived as
the beginning of the period in which the Board changed from being
viewed as prolabor to a time of being strictly nonpartisan, as indeed it
was meant to be."'
John R. Van de Water,
Former Chairman,
National Labor Relations Board
One might question whether the NLRB2 has ever been perceived as neutral,
at least by those whose environment it regulates. The pro-labor tilt of the
NLRB under the Wagner Act3 is sometimes cited as a factor which prompted
t Portions of this article were presented to the Midwest Labor Law Conference in Co-
lumbus, Ohio on October 15, 1984.
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana.
1. Van de Water, The NLRB... New Directions, 12 STETsoN L. REV. 297, 319-20 (1983).
John Van de Water was appointed Chairman of the NLRB by President Reagan through a
recess appointment on June 18, 1981. He was never confirmed by the Senate, and he resigned
on December 16, 1982.
2. The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter NLRB or Board) is an administrative
agency created by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). The Board's
powers are set forth in 29 U.S.C. §§ 156-161. Its most important function, and the primary focus
of this article, is its responsibility to prevent unfair labor practice. See 29 U.S.C. § 160.
3. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
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the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments. 4 At other times, often during the tenure
of conservative administrations, the Board has been viewed as pro-manage-
ment.5 Such perceptions are inevitable, given the nature of the Board's task.
The fact is that the decisions the Board makes, and the policies it thereby
adopts, are either favorable to labor or they are not. NLRB decisions
concerning the right of employees to discuss unionization or distribute lit-
erature in the workplace, for example, might be based on how the Board
members value free communication or value the right to control one's prop-
erty. 6 That is, the decisionmaker may not consciously opt for a result because
of its effect on labor or management. Nonetheless, the decision has an effect.
An NLRB panel that renders decisions broadening the right of employees
to communicate in the workplace is often viewed, then, not as composed
of decisionmakers who value first amendment freedoms and frank discussion
of controversial issues, but as a "pro-labor" Board. Conversely, a panel
that narrows communication rights is ordinarily regarded as pro-manage-
ment, rather than as decisionmakers who value the rights of property owners
and managers to control their holdings.
Whether the members of the Board engage in principled decisionmaking
or whether they consciously promote the interests of just one side of the
conflict is something about which one can only surmise. Certainly, the Board
is supposed to be neutral, and its members claim neutrality, as former
Chairman Van de Water did in the passage that opens this article. Even so,
the actions of the Board are, within limits, predictable. The Eisenhower
Board of the 1950's was generally regarded as pro-management. Many of
its decisions, however, were reversed by the Kennedy Board in the early
1960's.7 The designation of these panels by reference to the incumbent
4. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, tit. I, § 101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167 (1982)). See, e.g. R. GORiAN, BASIc TEXT
ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 5 (1976).
5. See cases and authorities cited infra note 7.
6. Full discussion of NLRB decisions on solicitation and distribution is beyond the scope
of this article. Basically, the Board permits employers to maintain rules that restrict solicitation
to nonworking time, see, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), and those
that restrict distribution to nonworking time in nonworking areas, see, e.g., Stoddard-
Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 179-
84. See also discussion of Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 394 (1983), infra notes 243-54 and
accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 143-45
(9th ed. 1981) (discussing NLRB treatment of employer speech in election campaigns during
the years of the Eisenhower administration and the effect of the Kennedy appointments beginning
in 1961). The changes in the Board wrought by the Kennedy administration had even more far-
reaching effects. In Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), the Board
found that the employer did not violate § 8(a)(5) (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)) when it failed to
bargain with the union about its decision to subcontract maintenance work performed by
bargaining unit employees. The following year, after new appointments by President Kennedy,
the Board reconsidered the same record and reversed its previous position. 138 N.L.R.B. 550
(1962). That decision was enforced by the Supreme Court, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), and has had
wide-reaching impact. Cf. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981),
discussed infra notes 164-206 and accompanying text. For another example of a case in which
the Kennedy Board reconsidered a decision in the same case, see Hod Carriers Local No. 840
(Blinne Constr. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962) (reaffirming earlier decision on other grounds).
See also Fanning, The NLRB in Transition, 12 CATH. U.L. REv. 16 (1963); Folgen, What's
Right is Right-Labor Board Should Not Be Political, 13 LAB. L.J. 1060 (1962); Christensen,
The "New" NLRB: An Analysis of Current Policy, 15 N.Y.U. CONG. ON LAB. 213 (1962).
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administration is no mistake. The President nominates the members of the
Board to five-year terms. 8 Not suprisingly, the appointees often share the
economic and social, if not the political, philosophy of the administration. 9
This philosophy is often revealed in NLRB opinions. During Democratic (or
"liberal") administrations, NLRB decisions often favor labor. The converse
is often true during Republican (or "conservative") presidencies. 0
Given the relatively direct impact of an administration's philosophy on
the Board, it seems likely that Board decisions are, in fact, principled and
are not merely expedients to bolster one side or the other. The predictability
of the decisions of a "liberal" or "conservative" panel stems not from
narrow-minded attempts to help or hurt one side, but from the values and
philosophy shared by the membership. One might expect, then, that ap-
pointees chosen by President Kennedy would share perceptions of national
labor policy that differ from members chosen by President Reagan. Within
the political context of each Board, however, its decisions can be called
"neutral." At least, Board members implement a social and economic phi-
losophy in a consistent and neutral fashion, though the decisions may favor
one side more often than the other.
Critics of the Board who charge bias ignore the fundamental issue un-
derlying NLRB decisionmaking. The question that should be addressed is
not whether a particular Board membership is pro-labor or pro-management,
but whether its decisions implement a desirable national labor policy. In
short, critics should not dismiss the Board as composed of narrow-minded
automatons who cater to only one constituency, but should debate the values
and assumptions that shape its decisions. Within that framework, this article
examines the effect of the Reagan appointees on Board policy.
For the most part, the important decisions of the Reagan Board have
favored management. Several of the decisions have been cited by labor as
strong evidence of a pro-management bias. This article analyzes each of
those decisions. The analysis indicates that, even though many of the Board's
decisions are subject to significant criticism, there is no warrant for the
frenzied reaction the decisions have produced.
I. ARBITRATION
One of the more controversial questions the NLRB has faced over the
past 30 years is how much deference it should show to arbitration in the
8. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
9. There are a few notable exceptions. John Fanning, for example, was first appointed to
the Board by President Eisenhower, but was generally regarded as one of the NLRB's most
"liberal" members. For example, in the first Fibreboard Paper Prods. decision, discussed supra
note 7, Fanning dissented from the Board's dismissal of the § 8(a)(5) allegations. 130 N.L.R.B.
1558, 1562 (1961). Subsequently, the Board reconsidered the case and adopted Fanning's
position, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962). For more on the views of former Chairman Fanning, see
Fanning, The National Labor Relations Act and the Role of the NLRB, 29 LAB. L.J. 683
(1978).
10. See, e.g., the discussion of the "Kennedy Board," supra note 7. Today's "Reagan
Board" is regarded as a conservative panel.
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adjudication of unfair labor practice cases. The Supreme Court has said
that private agreements to arbitrate contractual disputes do not deprive the
Board of jurisdiction to hear unfair labor practice charges." Often, however,
the same facts are alleged to constitute both an unfair labor practice and a
violation of a collective bargaining agreement.' 2 In such cases, the Board
has been urged both by commentators and by some of its own members to
defer its processes in favor of arbitration. 3 Although deferral might con-
tribute to Board efficiency by reducing its caseload, the primary benefit is
thought to be encouragement of the voluntary arbitration process as a way
of settling labor disputes peacefully.
4
NLRB deferral to arbitration falls into two distinct, though related, cat-
egories. In Spielberg Manufacturing Co., '5 the Board said it would defer its
unfair labor practice jurisdiction in favor of an already completed arbitration
award where "the proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all
parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel
is clearly not repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act."'' 6 As the
Board further explained in International Harvester Co.,' 7 deferral to an
arbitration that involved the same subject matter as an unfair labor practice
charge would give hospitable acceptance to the arbitration process as "part
and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself." 8
The other branch of the deferral doctrine is represented by Collyer In-
sulated Wire. '9 In that case the union filed a refusal to bargain charge against
an employer who unilaterally changed wage rates during the contract term.
The Board noted that the legitimacy of the employer's action depended on
the meaning of the contract clause that allowed the employer to make certain
"adjustments" in order to "remove inequalities or for other proper reasons"
subject to review through the grievance and arbitration procedures. 20 Al-
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); NLRB v. Acme Indus.
Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
12. For example, an employee who claims that her discharge or discipline was prompted
by employer opposition to union activity might allege a violation of § 8(a)(3) (29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3)), which prohibits such discrimination. She might also allege that the action violates
a contractual requirement that discipline be only for "proper cause." In addition, unilateral
action by an employer concerning a mandatory subject for bargaining might be alleged to
violate the terms of a labor contract, and may also violate § 8(a)(5) (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)).
13. See, e.g., Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 867-69 (1978) (Truesdale, concurring);
Note, The NLRB and Deferral to Awards of Arbitration Panels, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
124 (1981); Wollett, The Agreement and the National Labor Relations Act: Courts, Arbitrators
and the NLRB-Who Decides What?, 14 LAB. L.J. 1041 (1963).
14. See, e.g., International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 926-27 (1962).
15. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
16. Id. at 1082.
17. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
18. Id. at 927, quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960).
19. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
20. Id. at 839-40.
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though the Board can interpret labor contracts in order to resolve unfair
labor practice charges, 2' it deferred action to arbitration, reasoning that
because the dispute centered entirely on the parties' contract, it "ought to
be resolved in the manner which that contract prescribes. ' 22 Rejecting a
dissenter's contentions that deferral stripped the charging party of its sta-
tutory right to an unfair labor practice adjudication and substituted com-
pulsory arbitration, 23 the majority said its decision did nothing more than
relegate the parties to the procedure they had voluntarily adopted for the
resolution of contractual disputes. 24
Although the Collyer Wire doctrine has provoked more controversy, 25
neither Collyer Wire nor Spielberg has enjoyed a stable history and both
have produced harsh exchanges among Board members. 26 Recently, the Board
has rekindled the debate in decisions that expand the scope of deferrable
cases under both Collyer Wire and Spielberg.
A. Spielberg Deferral: The Olin Case
Unlike Collyer Wire deferral, which some members have criticized as an
abdication of the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction in favor of an
unnamed arbitrator,2 7 most Board members have accepted the Spielberg
principle of deferring to an already completed arbitration. 28 There is even
general agreement about most deferral criteria. Although Board members
have occasionally criticized colleagues for reconsidering the merits of a case
under the guise of determining repugnancy, 29 most have at least said they
will defer to arbitration decisions that are not repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act. In addition, to warrant deferral, all have conceded
that the parties had to agree to be bound by the arbitrator's award and that
the procedures used in the arbitration had to be fair and regular. As discussed
21. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 428 (1967).
22. Collyer Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 839.
23. Id. at 849 (Fanning, dissenting).
24. Id. at 842.
25. See, e.g., Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J.
57(1973); Schatzki, NLRB Resolution of Contract Disputes Under Section 8(a)(5), 50 TEx. L. REV.
225 (1972).
26. As to Spielberg deferral, see Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) ("[t]he dissent
attempts to distort our holding") and the dissenting opinion of Member Zimmerman, id. at
577-81. As to Collyer deferral, see the Collyer Wire opinion itself, 192 N.L.R.B. at 846 (Fanning,
dissenting) and id. at 850 (Jenkins, dissenting).
27. See, e.g., Collyer Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 849 (Fanning, dissenting).
28. The legitimacy of Spielberg deferral was questioned by the dissenters in Electronic
Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974), who contended that the Supreme Court's
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (federal courts not required
to defer actions brought under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17, to previously concluded arbitration covering the same facts) deprived the Board of
the power to defer cases involving statutory rights to arbitration. 213 N.L.R.B. at 765 (Fanning
and Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. See, e.g., Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 869 (1978) (Truesdale, concurring).
19851
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earlier, those criteria were established in Spielberg itself. Much controversy,
however, has been generated by a criterion added subsequently: congruence
of issues between the subject of the arbitration and the substance of the
unfair labor practice charge.
The congruence requirement is often traced to the Board's opinions in
Monsanto Chemical Co?0 and Raytheon Co.3 The Monsanto case involved
the discharge of a union steward, allegedly for an unexcused absence. Al-
though the union contended that Monsanto's asserted reason was a mere
pretext and that the discharge had been prompted instead by the steward's
union activities, the arbitrator refused to even consider the issue. Noting
that the Board had jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases, the arbitrator
said, "I have chosen to ignore ... the allegations herein contained that [the
steward's] Union activities played a part in his discharge. 3 2
Although the Board declared that it would continue to adhere to Spielberg
principles in order to "promote . . . voluntary adjustment of labor dis-
putes, ' 3 it declined to defer in Monsanto in light of the arbitrator's express
refusal to consider the pretext evidence:
It manifestly could not encourage the voluntary settlement of disputes
or effectuate the policies and purposes of the Act to give binding effect
in an unfair labor practice proceeding to an arbitration award which
does not purport to resolve the unfair labor practice issue which was
before the arbitrator and which is the very issue the Board is called upon
to decide in the proceeding before it. 3'
In short, the arbitrator's refusal to consider facts allegedly showing that the
steward was fired for union activity (evidence which was properly before
30. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1961).
31. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963).
32. Monsanto, 130 N.L.R.B. at 1099.
33. Id. at 1098.
34. Id. at 1099. Although the Board did not defer in Monsanto, another case decided the
same day indicates that Monsanto did not signal a retreat from Spielberg principles. In I.
Oscherwitz & Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1961), an arbitrator had upheld the discharge of a
union steward who had been fired, allegedly for insubordination. The extent to which the
arbitrator considered allegations that the discharge was actually prompted by union activity is
not made clear in the Board's opinion. The Hearing Examiner recommended that the Board
not defer. He questioned whether the proceedings were fair and regular and whether all parties
had agreed to be bound and concluded that the award was repugnant to the Act:
To permit an arbitration award to stand in the way of remedying an act of
discrimination against an employee in violation of section 8(a)(3) would be to
deny enforcement of the provision of the Act that goes to the very heart of its
policy.
Id. at 1095 (citations omitted).
Despite the Hearing Examiner's recommendation, the Board deferred to the arbitrator's opin-
ion, simply saying in conclusory fashion that the Spielberg criteria were satisfied and that the award
was not repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. Id. at 1079-80.
In contrast to Monsanto, then, the Board deferred to arbitration, even though the opinions
did not disclose the extent to which the arbitrator had considered allegations of anti-union
motivation. This decision would seem to narrow the effect of Monsanto, where the Board
refused deferral because the arbitrator expressly refused to consider the union activity issue.
[Vol. 60:227
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the arbitrator because it presumably would negate the employer's position
that the employee was fired for an unexcused absence) precluded deferral
in the subsequent Board proceeding where the same facts were asserted to
establish an unfair labor practice.
On its face, the Raytheon opinion seems equally non-controversial. There,
an arbitrator upheld the discharge of two employees who, he found, had
instigated and participated in a work stoppage in violation of the contract.
At the inception of the hearing, the employer's counsel cautioned the ar-
bitrator that his jurisdiction extended only to the alleged contract violation.35
Citing Monsanto as authority, the Board refused to defer, holding that
deferral is not appropriate where an arbitrator does not consider evidence
concerning the unfair labor practice.3 6
Taken together, Monsanto and Raytheon seem to say that the Board will
not defer its jurisdiction to arbitration awards that do not resolve the sta-
tutory issue. However important the national labor policy of encouraging
peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration might be, the Board's
statutory obligation to resolve unfair labor practices cannot yield merely
because an employer and a union have arbitrated a case. At the very least,
the arbitrator must have considered the issues present in the unfair labor
practice case. Despite this seemingly uncomplicated requirement, consistent
application of the Monsanto-Raytheon congruence criterion has, as the Board
said recently, "proven elusive. ' 37
Although subsequent cases reaffirmed the Monsanto-Raytheon holdings,3"
the Board adopted a new and controversial stance in 1974. In Electronic
Reproduction Service Corp.,39 the arbitrator considered whether the layoff
of three employees violated the contract. During the hearing the employer
argued that the union should be required to submit any evidence it had
bearing on the issue, including facts that might demonstrate anti-union
discrimination. The union replied that it would submit the evidence it deemed
"pertinent."' 4 With respect to one of the employees, the Board found not
only that the union had submitted evidence of anti-union bias, but also that
the arbitrator had considered it and had based his decision on it.41 With
respect to the other two employees, however, the arbitrator's award did not
disclose whether such evidence was offered by the union or, if it was, whether
the arbitrator considered it. He merely denied the grievance, finding erro-
35. Raytheon, 140 N.L.R.B. at 884.
36. Id. at 884-85.
37. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
38. Trygon Elec., Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 404 (1972); Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928
(1972); Montgomery Ward & Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 725 (1972); Airco Indus. Gases, 195 N.L.R.B.
676 (1972); and Kalamazoo Gazette, 193 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1971).
39. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
40. Id. at 759.
41. Id. at 759-60. Employee Brown was found to have been discriminatorily laid off as a
result of his activities as union steward.
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neous a union contention that the employees were contractually entitled to
recall notice.4 2
Under the Monsanto-Raytheon progeny, the unfair labor practice charge
filed on behalf of these two employees should not have been deferred because
the arbitrator's award gave no indication that he had ruled on the discrim-
ination issue or, for that matter, that he had even received evidence of
discrimination. Notwithstanding its prior cases, however, the Board deferred
to the arbitrator's award, in the process adopting a new test intended to
increase the breadth of post-arbitral deferral.
The Board noted that the objectives of deferral to arbitration were to
discourage "dual litigation and forum shopping" and to encourage resort
to contractual dispute resolution procedures. 43 It claimed, however, that the
Monsanto-Raytheon progeny had undermined those objectives by encour-
aging the parties to withhold relevant evidence from the arbitrator in the
hope of getting two chances to win what was essentially one case. The Board
majority said that those tactics created an artificial separation of the just
cause contractual issue and the statutory discrimination issue:
For in discharge and discipline cases the basic contractual issue is whether
or not the grievant has been disciplined or discharged for just cause. It
is of course obvious that 'just cause' does not include illegal or discrim-
inatory reasons . . . [and] [a]rbitrators have repeatedly so held."
The Board conceded that there were some cases in which allegations of
discriminatory motive were not resolved by arbitrators. It acknowledged that
the parties could restrict the arbitrator's authority to consider the issue and
that arbitrators could simply decline to pass upon it, as happend in Mon-
santo. The Board was confident, however, that the "usual and normal
practice" was for all evidence concerning "justness or unjustness" to be
submitted to the arbitrator, including evidence of anti-union bias .4 There-
fore, the Board said it would defer to arbitration awards even though
evidence of anti-union discrimination was not presented to the arbitrator,
unless the failure to present it was prompted by "unusual circumstances"
other than a desire to preserve a second forum before the Board. 46
The Electronic Reproduction standards not only produced disagreement
among Board members, 47 they also encountered significant criticism in the
courts of appeals.4 8 After issuing several opinions that seemed to question
42. Id. at 759.
43. Id. at 761.
44. Id. (footnote omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id. In addition to not ordering deferral when the parties excluded from the arbitrator
evidence relating to the unfair labor practice or when the arbitrator refused to consider the
evidence, the Board also said it would not defer if there was newly discovered evidence or
evidence that had been unavailable at the time of the arbitration hearing. Id. at 762 n.18.
47. See, e.g., id. at 765 (Fanning and Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1977).
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the continuing validity of Electronic Reproduction,49 the Board overruled it
in Suburban Motor Freight, Inc. 50 The opinion was brief, as it might well
have been since only the Board's membership, and not the policy issues at
stake, had changed in the interval since Electronic Reproduction.5' The Board
found that the union had not, during an arbitration, raised anti-union bias
as a factor contributing to the discipline of a truck driver. Citing a law
review article that criticized Electronic Reproduction as a "shocking sacrifice
of individual rights on the altar of institutionalism, ' 5 2 the Board said that
experience had led it to believe that its practice "[p]romote[s] the statutory
purpose of encouraging collective bargaining relationships, but derogates the
equally important purpose of protecting employees in the exercise of their
rights under section 7 of the Act."5 3 The Board announced that it would
return to the deferral policy that existed prior to Electronic Reproduction.
Specifically, the Board said it would not defer under Spielberg unless the
unfair labor practice issue was "both presented to and considered by the
arbitrator" and that it would "give no deference to an arbitration award
which bears no indication that the arbitrator ruled on the statutory issue of
discrimination in determining the propriety of an employer's disciplinary
actions."'54 The Board also announced it would place on the party seeking
deferral the burden of establishing that the unfair labor practice issue was
litigated in arbitration.5
In early 1984, following another shift in membership and philosophy, 56
the Board overruled Suburban Motor Freight. In Olin Corp.,57 the employer
discharged the president of the local union after he allegedly violated a
provision of a collective bargaining agreement that not only prohibited strikes
but also placed an affirmative obligation on union officers and represen-
49. See, e.g., Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 804 (1978), enforced, 640 F.2d 197 (9th
Cir. 1980); Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 6 (1978); Kansas City Star Co., 236
N.L.R.B. 866 (1978).
50. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
51. By the time of the Board's decision, two members of the three-person majority in
Electronic Reproduction (Chairman Miller and Member Kennedy) had left the Board. The
Board had only four members when it decided Suburban Motor Freight. Chairman Fanning
and Member Jenkins, the dissenters in Electronic Reproduction, were joined by new Member
Truesdale in overruling it. Member Pennello, the sole remaining member of the Electronic
Reproduction majority, dissented in Suburban Motor Freight.
52. See Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation and the Interests of the Individual
Worker: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 909 n.32 (1975).
53. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 146.
54. Id. at 146-47.
55. Id. at 147.
56. None of the members who participated in Suburban Motor Freight remained on the
Board when it was overruled in Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). The three members in
the Olin majority (Chairman Dotson, and Members Hunter and Dennis) were appointed by
President Reagan. Member Zimmerman, who dissented in part in Olin, was appointed by
President Carter.
57. 268 N.L.R.B. at 573.
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tatives not to cause or permit them. 5 An arbitrator upheld the discharge,
finding that the union president had "at least partially caused or partici-
pated" in a sick out, and that he had failed to help prevent it. The arbitrator
found that the union president's conduct violated both the express terms of
the collective bargaining agreement and an implicit duty of union officers
not to cause or participate in strikes forbidden by the labor contract. 59 The
arbitrator also found "no evidence" that the discharge was prompted by
"legitimate Union activities."0
Despite the arbitrator's finding with respect to lack of anti-union bias,
the Board's administrative law judge (ALJ) refused to defer to the award.
The ALJ reasoned that the arbitrator had not considered the discrimination
issue "in any serious way" and that, in any event, he was "not competent"
to decide the unfair labor practice issue since his authority was limited to
contract interpretation. 6' The ALJ decided the case on the merits, ultimately
reaching the same result as the arbitrator. 62
The Board majority agreed with the AL's recommendation to dismiss
the charge, but in doing so criticized his reconsideration of the merits of
the case and, instead, deferred to the arbitrator's award. 63 In broadening
the scope of post-arbitral deferral, the majority criticized prior decisions as
having applied a standard that made deferral appropriate "only when the
Board determines on de novo consideration that the award disposes of the
issues just as the Board would have.'' 64 Adopting a test proposed by Member
Hunter in a previous dissenting opinion, 65 the Board reaffirmed the tradi-
tional Spielberg criteria and, with respect to the congruence issue, said it
would find that an arbitrator had adequately considered an unfair labor
practice issue if: "(1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair
labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the
facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice issue." ' 66 In addition, the
Board shifted the burden of proof, announcing that it would require the
party opposing deferral (typically the General Counsel who prosecutes the
58. Id. The discharge notification charged the union president with threatening a sick out,
participating in it, and failing to prevent it. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The arbitrator made this finding in light of his recognition that the Board had
deferred consideration of a § 8(a)(3) charge under Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 573.
61. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 573.
62. The ALJ found that the no-strike clause at issue was a "clear and unmistakable" waiver
of the right of union representatives to engage in strike activity, and that the union president's
participation was "inconsistent with his manifest contractual obligation." Id. He also noted
that the union's clear waiver of the president's rights had been sanctioned by the Supreme
Court in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 46 U.S. 912 (1983).
63. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 573.
64. Id. at 574.
65. See Propoco, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 145 (1982) (Hunter, dissenting), enforced, 742 F.2d
1438 (2d Cir. 1983).
66. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
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unfair labor practice charge) to show that the new congruence standards
have not been met.67
Noting that contractual and statutory standards sometimes vary (a factor
that had precipitated the administrative law judge's refusal to defer), 68 the
Board said such differences, if any, would be weighed in the determination
of whether the result reached by the arbitrator was clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act, a traditional Spielberg criterion. However,
the Board cautioned that the repugnancy standard did not require an ar-
bitrator's decision to be "totally consistent with Board precedent" and that
it would defer unless the award is "palpably wrong," i.e., unless the ar-
bitrator's decision is "not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with
the Act." 69
In a sharply worded dissent, Member Zimmerman accused the majority
of grossly mischaracterizing prior Board decisions and of adopting a new
test that he called indistinguishable from the discredited standard of Elec-
tronic Reproduction.70 Zimmerman charged that the Board's new two-step
congruence test actually involved only one step:
67. Id. In addition, the Board said, "if a respondent establishes that an arbitration con-
cerning the matter before the Board has taken place, the burden of persuasion rests with the
General Counsel to demonstrate that there are deficiencies in the arbitral process requiring the
Board to ignore the determination of the arbitrator and subject the case to de novo review."
Id. at 575.
68. Id. at 574. In unfair labor practice cases involving allegations that an employee has
waived a statutory right to engage in union or concerted activity or that a party has waived
its right to bargain, the Board, with Supreme Court approval, requires evidence of clear and
unmistakable waiver, see, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 912 (1983), a
standard which is presumably more stringent than contractual waiver standards applied by
arbitrators. See generally 2 C. MoRRIs, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 640-50 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as C. Moeaus].
69. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 575. With respect to the particular facts at issue, the Board
found the contractual and unfair labor practice issues to be parallel: the arbitrator considered
whether there was a "sick out" and whether the discharged employee caused it, participated
in it, or failed to stop it. He also considered whether the discharge was a result of the sick
out or anti-union bias. Those issues, said the Board, were "coextensive" with the statutory
question of whether the labor contract "clearly and unmistakably proscribed the behavior" of
the union president. Id. at 576. The Board also said that the arbitrator was presented with
facts relevant to the unfair labor practice issue and that the General Counsel had failed to
show that the arbitrator lacked evidence "relevant to the determination of the nature of the
obligations imposed by the no strike clause ... and to a determination of the nexus between
that clause and [the president's] conduct," id., a burden the General Counsel did not realize
he shouldered when the case was tried. In any event, the Board said that the evidence necessary
for a determination of either the unfair labor practice charge or the contractual issue was
"essentially the same" and that the Board had no business relitigating the case if the arbitrator
had already considered the essential facts. Id. Finally, the Board concluded that the arbitrator's
decision did not offend the waiver standards established by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan
Edison, see supra note 68, and that the General Counsel had not shown the arbitrator's decision
to be clearly repugnant to the Act. Although the Board noted that members might disagree as
to the "standards of specificity" necessary to find a waiver of protected rights, it said the
arbitrator had a "reasonable basis" for his decision. Id.
70. Id. at 578.
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If the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice
issue, then how can one possibly prove that the facts relevant to resolving
the unfair labor practice issue have not been presented to the arbitrator
unless one proves the absurdity that even the facts relevant to the contract
issue were not presented?7
Zimmerman contended that under the majority's test the only real issue was
one of factual parallelism and that, once that hurdle was cleared, the Board
would presume that the arbitrator had considered both the statutory and
contractual issues unless the General Counsel could prove otherwise. He
argued that Electronic Reproduction had been based on the same presump-
tion and that, just as in that case, the Board would defer to an arbitrator's
award "without actually knowing if the issue was presented to or considered
by the arbitrator."72
Although Olin centers around the congruence requirement, the issues it
stirs are larger. Board members have often charged that NLRB decisions
accept the principle of post-arbitral deferral in form only, deferring to
arbitrator's awards only if de novo consideration of the facts by the Board
produces the same result. They also charge that the Board too often rejects
awards as repugnant to the Act merely because it disagrees with the result
reached by the arbitrator. 73 Olin not only establishes what could be a work-
able test for determining whether the unfair labor practice issue was resolved
in arbitration, it also signals an intention to give the awards themselves more
hospitable acceptance.
As recognized by Zimmerman in his dissenting opinion, the Board's new
two-tiered approach to congruence may not be as benign as it appears.
Viewed objectively (no mean feat in labor relations), the test makes sense.
If the unfair labor practice issue and the contractual issue are, in fact,
parallel and if the arbitrator considered facts relevant to the unfair labor
practice issue, relitigation of those same facts before the Board holds the
arbitration award for naught and frustrates the parties' effort to settle
disputes peacefully without governmental intervention. Although the Board
retains jurisdiction over the case, its function should be limited to determining
procedural fairness and in deciding whether the result reached by the arbi-
trator was consistent with the Act, which does not mean that the Board
would necessarily have reached the same result.
Zimmerman suggests, however, that a broad interpretation of the paral-
lelism requirement could deprive the Board of jurisdiction even though the
arbitrator might not have considered facts relevant to the unfair labor practice
issue. Zimmerman's concern is a significant one: casual acceptance of par-
allelism will too readily deprive employees of their statutory forum. Never-
71. Id. at 579.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., id. at 573-74. See also Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866 (1978);
Propoco, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 145 (1982) (Hunter, dissenting), enforced, 742 F.2d 1438
(2d Cir. 1983).
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theless, the possibility that the test will be misapplied is not a sufficient
reason to oppose it and, as Zimmerman's opinion indicates, probably is not
his real concern.
The difficulty in applying Spielberg has not been confusion over congru-
ence of issues or the obscurity of repugnancy standards. Rather, the problem
has been the stubborn refusal of some NLRB members to recognize arbi-
tration as a significant dispute resolution procedure. Nowhere is that attitute
more apparent than in Zimmerman's characterization of arbitration in his
Olin dissent:
Sometimes less expensive, more informal, or more expeditious arbitration
may be an attractive way to resolve minor grievances and disputes which
are essentially contractual in nature. 74
If one starts with the premise that labor arbitration is appropriate for
resolution of only minor contractual disputes, while the Board is engaged
in the important business of securing statutory rights, one will undoubtedly
conclude that the Board should rarely defer to arbitration. Those same
attitudes were present in the opinion of the Olin ALJ, who concluded that
the arbitrator was "not competent" to resolve the unfair labor practice
issue.75 This theme runs through other Board opinions as well. 76
It is not clear why Board members have been suspicious of the ability of
arbitrators to resolve factual disputes in a manner that protects the rights
of individual employees, unions, and employers. Many arbitrators hear doz-
ens of cases a year, some of which rival or exceed the complexity of NLRB
hearings. There is no reason to assume that the Board's administrative law
judges are either more skilled as fact-finders or more sensitive to the labor
relations environment. Moreover, traditional Spielberg criteria protect against
the possibility that procedural failures within the arbitration will prejudice
employee rights. Even when procedural problems have not been present,
however, the Board has often refused to defer, sometimes claiming either
repugnancy or a lack of congruence to mask the resentment to the arbitral
process openly expressed by Zimmerman in Olin. Although the Board was
less candid about its motives, the Raytheon case itself provides an example.
In Raytheon, two employees (Reikard and Fisk) were discharged for in-
stigating and participating in a brief work stoppage. The contract forbade
strikes during its term and gave the company the right to discipline or
discharge employees (subject to the grievance procedure) for "engaging in,
participating in, or encouraging such unauthorized action. . .. '77 The ar-
74. 268 N.L.R.B. at 581 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 573.
76. See, e.g., United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 563 (1984) (Zimmerman,
dissenting) ("The arbitration process is ... not particularly adept at protecting employee
statutory or public rights."); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 848 (1971) (Fanning,
dissenting).
77. Raytheon, 140 N.L.R.B. at 888 n.9.
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bitrator concluded that the two employees had "instigated and led" a work
stoppage and that their discharge was "not improper. 7
8
Upholding its hearing examiner's refusal to defer, the NLRB noted that,
at the inception of the arbitration hearing, the employer's counsel cautioned
the arbitrator that his jurisdiction extended no further than a determination
of the alleged contract violation.79 Relying on Monsanto, the Board decided
that deferral was not appropriate since the arbitrator had been presented
solely with evidence concerning the contractual issue and not with any
evidence of protected union or concerted activities. 0
The majority's characterization of the case was clearly wrong. Although
they disagreed about the result, the arbitrator and the ALJ did the same
thing. The arbitrator found that there was a work stoppage and that the
two discharged employees both instigated it and participated in it. Despite
the contrary suggestion of the Board, the hearing examiner did not apply
special statutory standards beyond the competency of the arbitrator. He
simply drew conflicting inferences from essentially the same evidence con-
sidered by the arbitrator."' Thus, the hearing examiner found that there was,
in fact, no walkout and that Reikard and Fisk did not incite employees "to
engage in what as a fact did not occur." ' 2 Since there was no walkout that
could conceivably prompt discipline, the hearing examiner concluded that
the employer's reason for discipline must have been pretextual . 3
In its opinion, the Board argued that the arbitrator could not have con-
sidered the unfair labor practice issue because the employer expressly limited
his authority to contract interpretation. The deferral issue, however, ignored
by the Raytheon majority and overlooked as well by Zimmerman in Olin,84
is not whether the arbitrator expressly decided the unfair labor practice
charge but whether he resolved the factual issues which themselves would
78. Id. at 897.
79. The Board quoted the following passage from the transcript of the arbitration:
Therefore if you find on the basis of the evidence that will be introduced today
that the two grievants in question engaged in conduct violative of Article 23 ...
then it is submitted that you have no choice but to sustain the discharge, that
your jurisdiction does not extend any further than to such a determination.
Id. at 884 (emphasis supplied by the Board).
80. Id.
81. The evidence before the arbitrator was not identical to that presented to the Hearing
Examiner. The supervisor of the discharged employees did not testify at the arbitration hearing,
but he was called at the unfair labor practice hearing. Id. at 885-86. The Board also noted
that neither of the discharged employees attended the arbitration hearing. Id. at 886. The
dissent asserted, however, that both employees had notice of the hearing and that neither
explained her absence. Id. at 890-91.
82. Id. at 897.
83. Id. at 898.
84. 268 N.L.R.B. at 579.
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determine the existence of an unfair labor practice.8 5 In Raytheon, for
example, the arbitrator determined that there had been a walk-out which
the two discharged employees instigated and participated in and that their"
discharge was prompted by the action. Those facts not only determine the
contractual issue, but the unfair labor practice issue as well. The hearing
examiner did not discover any "secret" intention on the part of the employer
to retaliate against the discharged employees for union activity, nor did he
apply to the evidence any test peculiar to the knowledge or ability of the
Board. He simply disagreed with the arbitrator about what the evidence
proved.8 6 Although hailed by Zimmerman as the cornerstone of NLRB
deferral policy, Raytheon is, in reality, a transparent decision that does
nothing more than reverse an arbitration award with which the Board ma-
jority disagreed.87
The two-tiered approach adopted in Olin would have-and should have-
produced deferral in Raytheon. The issues before the Board and the arbitrator
depended on the same factual determination, i.e., whether the two discharged
employees instigated and participated in a work stoppage. The arbitrator
received evidence concerning that factual issue and resolved it. Because the
factual issues were parallel and because the arbitrator heard evidence relevant
to the unfair labor practice issue, the only other inquiry before the Board
was application of traditional Spielberg criteria, including whether the ar-
bitrator's decision was repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.
As part of that inquiry the Board would consider whether the facts found
by the arbitrator justified the result in light of established Board precedent.
That does not mean that the arbitrator had to apply NLRB standards with
85. In Olin, for example, Zimmerman said the Board's new test will allow deferral even
though the unfair labor practice issue may not have been presented to the arbitrator. Id.
Similarly, in Raytheon, the Board stressed that only the contractual issue had been presented
to the arbitrator. 140 N.L.R.B. at 884-85. Such allegations miss the point of deferral entirely.
Arbitration, by its very nature, is contractual-it exists to resolve contractual disputes. It is
not intended to be a forum for the adjudication of statutory rights. The issue in deferral,
however, is the deference owed arbitration when an arbitrator, in a contractual proceeding,
resolves the same facts alleged to constitute a statutory violation as well. Assuming the similarity
of proof required (i.e., assuming "parallelism"), it is not necessary for the arbitrator to have
expressly considered statutory elements for the Board to defer to his factual findings.
86. The Board's decision was also premised on alleged procedural irregularities in that the
discharged employees did not attend the hearing. Raytheon, 140 N.L.R.B. at 886-87. It is
unclear why their absence would necessarily prejudice the case since each had notice of the
hearing, but failed to attend. Id. at 891.
87. The dissenting opinion in Raytheon recognized the proper role of deferral:
The underlying factual issue in both the arbitration and the unfair labor practice
proceeding was whether the dischargees engaged in a walkout or in conduct inciting
a walkout. If they had, their action was a breach of the no strike provisions of
the contract, and their conduct was not protected under the Act.
Id. at 890 (Leedom and Brown, dissenting).
For another case in which the Board did little more than relitigate the same facts that had
been tried in arbitration, see Propoco, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982), enforced, 742 F.2d 1438
(2d Cir. 1983).
1985]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
the same specificity used by the Board. Rather, the requirement is demon-
strated by what happened in Olin.
Resolution of the unfair labor practice issue in Olin depended on whether
the union had clearly and unmistakably waived the right of its officers to
engage in certain activity. The arbitrator found that the contract specifically
prohibited participation in strikes by union officers.88 That factual finding
resolves the unfair labor practice issue even though the arbitrator did not
apply the statutory standard of clear and unmistakable waiver. Although
some Board members might use the same facts to justify a finding of "no
waiver," an express contractual prohibition of strikes is enough to support
a conclusion that the union had waived the right of its officers to strike.
While the Board might have resolved the issue differently in the first instance,
it did not consider the case first. Unless it is to merely ignore the results
reached in labor arbitration, Spielberg requires the Board to defer when the
labor arbitrator's opinion is consistent with a proper interpretation of the
Act, even if it is not the decision the Board might have reached.
The application of the Olin test suggested here also indicates the fallacy
of Zimmerman's charge that the Board did nothing more than return to the
standard of Electronic Reproduction. Unlike Electronic Reproduction, Olin
requires the Board to defer only if the facts relevant to the unfair labor
practice charge are presented to the arbitrator. In order to warrant Board
deferral in the typical section 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge case, for ex-
ample, the arbitrator will have to have considered facts bearing on the
allegation of anti-union retaliation. This does not mean that the arbitrator
has to recognize expressly the possibility of a statutory violation or has to
apply statutory standards. In the course of its review, the Board can deter-
mine if the result reached by the arbitrator is consistent with those standards.
The arbitrator, however, must consider the facts from which an inference
of discrimination can be drawn. If no such facts are presented, then the
second half of the Olin standard is not met and deferral is not possible.
Finally, the Board's decision in Olin to shift the burden of proof to the
General Counsel is wholly unwarranted. The Board has jurisdiction over
unfair labor practice cases. The prosecutor should not have to convince the
Board to exercise it. Instead, the party seeking to avoid the jurisdiction of
the Board (typically the employer) should carry the burden of persuading
the Board to recognize the result reached by another tribunal.
B. Collyer Wire Deferral:
The United Technologies Case
Although pre-arbitral deferral of unfair labor practice charges has pro-
voked more controversy than the Spielberg doctrine, such action is easily
88. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 573.
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justified in section 8(a)(5) cases. In many cases involving unlawful unilateral
action, as in Collyer Wire itself, the employer's defense will be either that
the union waived its right to bargain or that the contract otherwise authorized
the change. In such cases, resolution of the charge will depend on an
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Clearly, the Board has
the power to interpret contracts in order to resolve an unfair labor practice
case. Even so, such disputes are essentially contractual and the Collyer Wire
doctrine does little more than relegate the parties to the procedure they
voluntarily agreed would be used to settle contract disputes. Deferral of
section 8(a)(5) charges, then, poses little danger to the rights of unions or
individual employees, or to the jurisdictional integrity of the Board. Rights
granted by contract will be secured by contractually provided remedies;
waivers authorized by contract will be enforced through the same procedure.
There is also little doubt that arbitrators, who sit only to decide contract
disputes, are just as adept at contract interpretation as Board members or
administrative law judges, whose statutory function divorces them from a
role in contract administration. Moreover, to the extent that the Board uses
stricter standards than arbitrators do in resolving questions of waiver, the
arbitration award can be measured against the Spielberg repugnancy standard
after the arbitration is concluded. 89
More controversial is the question of whether the Board should defer in
cases that do not necessarily depend on contract interpretation. Sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), for example, secure for employees the right to engage
in concerted or union activity without employer interference or discrimina-
tion. A unionized employer charged with a violation of employee rights
under these sections will often claim a contractual justification for his actions,
usually that discipline was imposed for "just cause." The union, however,
will almost certainly claim that the contractual justification is a mere pretext
used by the employer to cover up its unlawfully motivated conduct. 90 If,
during an arbitration hearing, the union presents evidence bearing on its
allegation of anti-union animus, then the Board can (and should) defer to
the arbitrator's opinion under its Spielberg doctrine, assuming the Olin
89. In pre-arbitral deferral under Collyer Wire, the Board retains jurisdiction for the ap-
plication of Spielberg principles following the arbitration. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
N.L.R.B. 837, 843 (1971). The factors warranting Collyer deferral, reiterated in United Tech-
nologies, are:
mhe dispute arose within the confines of a long and productive collective bar-
gaining relationship; there was no claim of employer animosity to the employees'
exercise of protected rights; the parties' contract provided for arbitration in a
very broad range of disputes; the arbitration clause encompassed the dispute at
issue; the employer had asserted its willingness to utilize arbitration to resolve the
dispute; and the dispute was eminently well suited to resolution by arbitration.
United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1984).
90. For a fuller description of the issues raised in such "pretext" cases, see C. MORRIS,
supra note 68, at 214-17. For the burden of proof required in such cases, see Wright Line,
Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
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guidelines are satisfied. 9' The question presented by Collyer Wire deferral is
whether the Board should refuse to hear an unfair labor practice case alleging
violations of individual statutory rights when the dispute is also arbitrable
under a collective bargaining agreement, but there has not been an arbitra-
tion. If the Collyer Wire doctrine applies, the Board defers the case to the
arbitral forum, retaining jurisdiction only for the purpose of determining
that the arbitration met Spielberg standards. As with Spielberg deferral,
NLRB decisions have been inconsistent.
While Collyer Wire dealt only with deferral of a section 8(a)(5) charge,
in the following year the Board decided that it would defer in section 8(a)(3)
cases as well. Although the Board recognized that section 8(a)(3) discrimi-
nation cases raise statutory issues that do not depend on the interpretation
of contractual terms for resolution, in National Radio Co., 92 it said that
deferring such cases would foster the federal policy of encouraging voluntary
arbitration of labor disputes. 93 The Board asserted that its decision was not
an abdication of its statutory power, but only an abstention in favor of
other important labor policies. 94 Five years later the Board retreated from
National Radio in its decision in General American Transportation Corp.95
Coupled with another decision issued the same day, 96 General American
Transportation produced a strange array of opinions that precluded appli-
cation of Collyer Wire deferral to section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) cases97
but permitted it in section 8(a)(5) cases. 98
91. See supra text accompanying note 66.
92. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
93. Id. at 530-31. The Board assumed that arbitration would provide a forum that would
resolve the dispute in a manner not repugnant to the Act. Id. at 531.
94. Id.
95. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
96. Roy Robinson Chevrolet, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 828 (1977).
97. Deferral was also precluded for cases arising under § 8(b)(l)(A) and § 8(b)(2).
98. Deferral is also available for § 8(b)(3) cases.
In General American Transportation the question was whether the Board should defer in
§ 8(a)(3) cases. In Roy Robinson Chevrolet, the Board considered the applicability of Collyer
Wire to § 8(a)(5) cases. Two members of the Board who had dissented in Collyer (Fanning
and Jenkins) also dissented in both General American Transporation and Roy Robinson Chev-
rolet, maintaining, as they had in Collyer, that the Board had no power to "cede its jurisdiction
to private tribunals." General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 808. Thus, Fanning and Jenkins
opposed deferral of both § 8(a)(3) and § 8(a)(5) cases, although they found deferral of § 8(a)(3)
cases particularly objectionable. Id. at 808-09. Two other members of the Board (Penello and
Walther) embraced a broad application of deferral, finding it appropriate in both § 8(a)(3) and
§ 8(a)(5) cases. Id. at 813.
The swing vote belonged to then Chairman Murphy. In General American Transportation,
Murphy joined Fanning and Jenkins to produce a three-person majority denying deferral in §
8(a)(3) cases. Id. at 810. Unlike Fanning and Jenkins, however, Murphy believed the Board
had the power to order pre-arbitral deferral. She found it inappropriate, however, in cases that
involved statutory rights as opposed to mere contract interpretation. Id. at 810-12. In Roy
Robinson Chevrolet, however, Murphy formed a three-person majority with Penello and Walther,
agreeing that deferral was appropriate in cases involving "purely the interpretation of the rights
and obligations of the parties under the collective bargaining agreement." Roy Robinson
Chevrolet, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 831 (1977).
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General American Transportation remained in force until early 1984, when
the Board returned to the standard of National Radio. In United Technol-
ogies Corp.,99 the union filed a section 8(a)(1) charge contending that the
employer had threatened an employee in order to discourage prosecution of
a grievance. Although noting that the administrative law judge had correctly
denied deferral under General American Transportation, the Board overruled
that case, thus opening the way to pre-arbitral deferral of sections 8(a)(3)
and 8(a)(1) cases. The Board majority charged that General American Trans-
portation had "emasculated" its deferral policy, one that had survived
judicial scrutiny and was based on sound practical considerations. 10 It said
broad-based deferral of unfair labor practice charges was not an abdication
but merely a "postponement" of its own processes in order to "give the
parties' own dispute resolution machinery"' 0' an opportunity to settle the
dispute:
Where an employer and a union have voluntarily elected to create
dispute resolution machinery culminating in final and binding arbitration,
it is contrary to the basic principles of the Act for the Board to jump
into the fray prior to an honest attempt by the parties to resolve their
disputes through tfiat machinery .... In our view, the statutory purpose
of encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining is ill-
served by permitting the parties to ignore their agreement and to petition
the Board in the first instance for remedial relief. 02
Member Zimmerman dissented, asserting that the Board's decision need-
lessly sacrificed employees' statutory rights by forcing them to arbitrate their
unfair labor practice cases. 03 He contended that the majority's decision was
reached despite the lack of any evidence that General American Transpor-
tation had adversely affected the operation of grievance-arbitration systems
and despite the absence of judicial criticism. Zimmerman argued that the
return to National Radio was premised merely "on three articles of faith." 104
First, Zimmerman criticized the majority's assertion that National Radio
had found judicial sanction. Although he conceded that there was judicial
acceptance of deferral generally, and Collyer Wire specifically, he denied
that such judicial approval embraced National Radio. To the contrary, he
read judicial opinions to mean that the Board's power to defer "is not
unlimited." Claiming support from both appellate and Supreme Court opin-
ions, Zimmerman argued that judicial precedent did not countenance the
abdication of Board jurisdiction to preserve employee section 7 rights. 05
99. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
100. Id. at 559.
101. Id. at 560.
102. Id. at 559.
103. Id. at 561.
104. Id. at 562.
105. Id. at 563.
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Zimmerman also disagreed with his colleagues' assertion that deferral was
necessary in order to bind parties to their collective agreements, a concept
the majority said was fundamental to collective bargaining.' °6 Zimmerman
charged that the Board's decision bound individual employees to arbitration
"as the only forum of first resort."' 07 He asserted that a union could not,
by agreeing to an arbitration clause, waive the statutory right of employees
"to choose a statutory forum in which to initiate and litigate an unfair labor
practice issue."'0 8
Finally, Zimmerman harshly criticized the majority's assertion that Collyer
Wire deferral of section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) cases was merely a "prudent
exercise of restraint"' 9 calculated to allow the parties time to use their own
procedures to settle the dispute and subject always to review under Spielberg
standards. Reminiscent of his Olin dissent, Zimmerman said that arbitration
was not "particularly adept at protecting employee statutory or public rights"
and that arbitrators might lack the capacity to resolve statutory issues."10 He
also asserted that unions, in bowing to majoritarian interests, might not
"vigorously support an employee's claim.""' Presumably, arbitrator incom-
petency or union neglect would be matters considered by the Board in post-
arbitral review. Without explaining his reasoning, however, Zimmerman
simply asserted that Spielberg "is not a catchall justification for withholding
Board processes until a reviewable arbitration award has been made."" 1 2
Although Zimmerman's refusal to overrule General American Transpor-
tation has merit, only his second criticism of the majority's decision is sound.
It is true, as Zimmerman asserts, that judicial opinions counsel some restraint
in NLRB deferral to arbitration. He cites no case, however, that directly
questions the principles of National Radio, even though they were applied
by the Board for nearly six years. Moreover, Zimmerman's criticism of
arbitrators' competency is the same tired refrain he sang in Olin. To the
contrary, there is every reason to believe that arbitrators are as skilled at
resolving facts as are administrative law judges and that those factual res-
olutions can, subject to Spielberg review, resolve both statutory and con-
tractual issues.
On the other hand, Zimmerman's charge that the majority has denied
employees their right to a statutory forum has considerable force. It is one
thing to defer under Spielberg when the parties to a collective agreement
have voluntarily submitted a case to arbitration. It is quite another thing,
however, to tell employees that statutory procedures are unavailable even
though there has been no arbitration. In Spielberg deferral, there has already
106. Id. at 561.
107. Id. at 562.
108. Id. at 563.
109. Id. at 562.
110. Id. at 563.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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been a full hearing of the employee's case and the complaint has been
resolved in a manner consistent with the Act. If arbitration is to mean
anything at all, the Board should withhold its jurisdiction in those circum-
stances. In Collyer Wire deferral, however, there has been no hearing. The
Board's decision to withhold its processes is clearly justified in section 8(a)(5)
cases when an interpretation of the contract will settle the dispute. It is not
justifiable in section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) cases where the issue involves
the application of statutory standards. Although the arbitrator can make
the factual resolutions necessary to apply those standards, the question is
whether an employee should be forced into an arbitral forum when he prefers
the statutory procedures established by Congress.
In United Technologies, the Board essentially ignored that issue, relegating
the problem to a footnote in which it asserted:
Nothing in this decision diminishes the rights of employees to seek
statutory relief for alleged unfair labor practices. We simply hold that
where contractual grievance-arbitration procedures have been invoked
voluntarily we should stay the exercise of the Board's procedures in order
to permit the parties to give full effect to those procedures." 3
This curious statement is, at best, confusing. Of course an employee's sta-
tutory right to invoke Board processes is diminished. Indeed, the right is
effectively denied. In addition, it is not clear how invocation of the grievance-
arbitration procedures can be called "voluntary" when the Board has told
employees that only those procedures are available for resolution of the
dispute.
Unlike the majority, Zimmerman confronts the issue directly in his dis-
senting opinion. He asserts that pre-arbitral deferral of section 8(a)(1) and
section 8(a)(3) cases constitutes an unwarranted waiver of employee statutory
rights. Although the majority did not couch its opinion in those terms, it
is clear that the decision has that effect. For example, the majority opinion
recognizes that unions and employers negotiate arbitration provisions to
resolve "their" disputes through "the parties' own ... machinery."" 4 The
parties to the contract are the employer and the union, not the individual
employees.' '5 Clearly, the union has the power to confine employees to
contractual procedures for the resolution of contractual claims." 6 The effect
of United Technologies, however, is to confine employees to the contractual
procedure for some unfair labor practice claims as well, even though those
claims do not arise under the contract and are not necessarily disputes
between the parties to the contract. The only justification ever asserted for
113. Id. at 563 n.17.
114. Id. at 559.
115. See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
116. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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this broad waiver of statutory rights is encouragement of a dispute resolution
system created principally to resolve contractual claims.
As argued above, the Board has often been guilty of underestimating both
the value of labor arbitration and the competency of labor arbitrators. The
peaceful processes of arbitration are a significant part of our system of
collective bargaining and have contributed to the protection of employee
rights and the enhancement of employee status. The Board should be hesitant
to take action that will undermine the utility of the system or the trust that
employees have for it. There is a limit, however, to the deference the Board
must pay. Arbitration is a concomitant to the Act; it does not replace it.
Arbitration deserves deference when it has already resolved the dispute or
when the issues are essentially contractual. However, employees who choose,
in the first instance, to press their statutory claims in the statutory forum
surely have that right. Forcing an employee to take his case elsewhere does
not foster the federal policy of encouraging resort to arbitration. One might
just as well assert that pre-arbitral deferral of individual statutory rights
cases discourages agreements to arbitrate, because such agreements are reached
only by forfeiting the statutory forum. In sum, the result of General Amer-
ican Transportation, though at the time reflecting the views of only one
member of the Board, was sound. The Board's reversal in United Tech-
nologies is an unwarranted denial of its statutory jurisdiction that provides
only questionable benefits for arbitration, but significant detriment to em-
ployee rights.
II. GISSEL ORDER CASES
A. Gourmet Foods
Gourmet Foods"7 is the latest round in the continuing debate about
whether the Board has authority to impose a remedial bargaining order
(often called a Gissel order) absent a showing of majority support for the
union. The problem can be traced to Chief Justice Warren's ambiguous
opinion in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,"8 where the Court approved the
Board's practice of ordering employees to bargain with the union as a remedy
for serious unfair labor practice notwithstanding the absence of an election
or even a union election loss. It did not indicate clearly, however, all the
criteria necessary to support such an order.
In the typical Gissel order case, the union will have either lost the election
or filed unfair labor practice charges against the employer that preclude an
election. In the latter case, the assumption usually is that the union no longer
117. 270 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 116 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1984).
118. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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has the strength necessary to win the election." 9 In Gissel, the Court said
that if the union once enjoyed majority status (usually proved through signed
union authorization cards) and if that status was undermined by an em-
ployer's serious unfair labor practices that made the holding of a free and
fair election unlikely, the Board could order the employer to bargain with
the union. 20 This remedy is popularly known as a Gissel category two order
(Gissel-II). Although such orders pose some danger to the Act's principle
of majority rule, the Court reasoned that the harm was slight because the
union once had a majority and because the employees are free, after a time,
to rid themselves of an unwanted union.' 2'
The question left open in Gissel, and purportedly resolved in Gourmet
Foods, concerns the validity of the so-called category one order (Gissel-I).
In a Gissel-I case, the union cannot show that it ever had majority support.
Nonetheless, a bargaining order is thought warranted in light of the em-
ployer's outrageous and pervasive unfair labor practices. 22 Category one
orders were not directly at issue in Gissel, and Chief Justice Warren's opinion
is unilluminating at best and confusing at worst. Chief Justice Warren noted
that the Fourth Circuit had "left open the possibility" of issuing a category
one order.Iu Although he said "the actual area of disagreement between
our position here and that of the Fourth Circuit is not large as a practical
matter,"' 24 he did not explain what the disagreement was. The Chief Justice
also observed that the "Board itself ... has long had a similar policy of
issuing a bargaining order, in the absence of a section 8(a)(5) violation or
even a bargaining demand, when that was the only available, effective remedy
for substantial unfair labor practices."'" This passage, combined with a
later reference to an order made in the absence of a section 8(a)(5) violation,' 26
119. For a fuller discussion of the Gissel remedy, see R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 93-104.
See generally Perl, The NLRB and Bargaining Orders: Does a New Era Begin with Gissel?,
15 VaL. L. REv. 106 (1969); Sharpe, A Reappraisal of the Bargaining Order: Toward a
Consistent Application of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 69 Nw. U.L. REy. 556 (1974).
120. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612.
121. Id. at 613.
122. See generally Hunter, Minority Bargaining Orders Usher in 1984 at the NLRB, 33 LAB.
L.J. 571 (1982); Comment, United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Association: NLRB Bargainitig
Orders in the Absence of a Clear Showing of a Pro-Union Majority, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 840
(1980). Both the Supreme Court's opinion and the NLRB decisions indicate that employer
misconduct must be more serious to warrant a Gissel-I order than a Gissel-II order. See, e.g.,
Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613-14; Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1190-91 (1982).
123. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613. In fact, in each of the Fourth Circuit cases considered by the
Court in Gissel, the union had a card based majority. For further discussion, see Member
Penello's opinion in United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n (I), 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1038-40,
enforced as modified, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1979).
124. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613.
125. Id. at 614.
126. Id. at 615. The Board said:
In Sinclair, No. 585 [one of the cases consolidated into the Gissel decision, see
395 U.S. at 580], the Board made a finding, left undisturbed by the First Circuit,
that the employer's threats of reprisal were so coercive that, even in the absence
of a § 8(a)(5) violation, a bargaining order would have been necessary to repair
the unlawful effect of those threats.
Presumably, "the absence of a § 8(a)(5) violation" refers to cases in which the union has
never had majority status, an issue that had not been before the Board in Sinclair, where the
union had a valid card majority. Id. at 589.
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has produced considerable debate. Was the Court approving the category
one order? If so, was it aware that the Board had not, in fact, issued one?
The opinion did not elaborate. Instead, Chief Justice Warren said that the
only effect of the Court's holding was to authorize bargaining orders "in
less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices" and that the
Board's authority to issue an order based on such a "lesser showing of
employer misconduct" required "a showing that at one point the union had
a majority.' v2 7 Did the Court mean that in more extreme cases, no majority
is necessary? Until 1982, the Board said no, maintaining, with some dissent,
that it had no power to impose non-majority bargaining orders . 2
In Conair Corp.,'29 however, the Board endorsed Gissel-I orders. The
majority criticized two dissenting colleagues for "focusing so narrowly and
abstractly on the principle of majority rule," a concededly important prin-
ciple but one which "has never been interpreted as standing in supreme
isolation from Board's other statutory policies and purposes."' 30 The ma-
jority argued that the employer's outragous unfair labor practices had pre-
cluded a free and fair election and concluded that the risk of imposing a
union against the wishes of the majority "is greatly outweighed by the risk
that, without a bargaining order, all employees would be indefinitely denied
their statutory right to make a fair determination whether they desire union
representation.''3 Conair was denied enforcement by a divided D.C. Circuit
which, like the Board, split over the tension generated between majority rule
and remedial efficacy. 32 In Gourmet Foods, the Board overruled Conair
127. Id. at 614.
128. In 1981, the Board issued a Gissel-I order in United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n (II),
257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981). Its order, however, was in response to an order of the Third Circuit
denying effect to the Board's earlier decision that it had no such power. United Dairy Farmers
Coop. Ass'n (I), 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, enforced as modified, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1979).
In its 1979 decision, the Board split three ways. Two members thought the Board "may" have
Gissel-I authority, but should not exercise it because of the risk to majoritarian principles. 242
N.L.R.B. at 1028. One member thought there was no such authority. Id. at 1038-45. The other
two members thought that the Board had Gissel-I authority, and would have imposed such an
order. Id. at 1031-38. On review, the Third Circuit decided that the Board had Gissel-I authority
and remanded the case, observing that the "mere absence of such indicia of majority support
does not in itself preclude the issuance of a bargaining order." 633 F.2d at 1068.
On remand, the Board had only three members. Two of them, Fanning and Jenkins, had defended
the Board's authority in the original decision, and embraced the Third Circuit opinion. Member
Zimmerman, who did not participate in the original decision, joined in the Board's order only
because of the Third Circuit's opinion. He, therefore, found it "unnecessary to determine
whether the Board has such authority." 257 N.L.R.B. at 772 n.8.
129. 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982), enforcement denied, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
130. Id. at 1193.
131. Id. at 1194.
132. The majority found that the Board had no authority to issue non-majority bargaining
orders. Conair, 721 F.2d at 1383-84. The dissenting judge found that such authority existed at
least where it was reasonable to believe that the union would have gained majority support.
Id. at 1390-91. This factor was part of the United Dairy Farmers test, but was not among the
criteria approved for a Gissel-I order by the Board in Conair.
The D.C. Circuit had previously commented on the same issue in Teamsters Local 115 (Haddon
House Food Prods.) v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837
(1982), indicating potential disagreement with the Third Circuit's opinion in United Dairy
Farmers, 633 F.2d 1054, discussed supra note 128.
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and produced yet another divided opinion on the scope of its remedial
authority.
A three member majority concluded that the Board has no power to issue
non-majority bargaining orders, but it produced two different opinions. The
plurality opinion'33 said the the Board's remedial power is broad, but not
unlimited, particularly "when its exercise would 'violate a fundamental prem-
ise on which the Act is based.' "'134 The fundamental premise at issue in
Gissel-I orders, of course, is majority rule. 3 Member Dennis concurred in a
short opinion in which she agreed that the Boatd had no power to issue
Gissel-I orders, but adopted the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Conair.136
Even if the Board had statutory authority to issue non-majority orders,
the plurality announced that it would not use them, claiming such action
would diminish the Board's public stature as an impartial agency. 37 More
importantly, the plurality opinion questioned whether a non-majority order
could be an effective remedy. It noted that a minority union would lack
"the leverage normally possessed by" elected unions in dealing with em-
ployers:
To gain that leverage, employees may be called on to demonstrate active
support for a representative in a far more open way than a secret-ballot
election. Accordingly, in imposing a representative on employees, the
Board may be changing only the sphere of employees' choice. And yet
the Board can be no more certain that, in this new sphere of employee
choice, employees can more freely exercise their choice without regard
to any lingering effects of massive unfair labor practices than it can be
if a new election is directed after the Board has applied traditional as
well as appropriate extraordinary remedies.1'3
In dissent, Zimmerman said the plurality position was a "distortion of
the principle of majority rule"' 3 9 and claimed that failure to issue non-
majority orders would permit employers "to engage in unlawful acts that
are so coercive as to prevent majority support from ever developing,"'140
thus allowing them the fruits of their own misconduct. Zimmerman asserted
that Gissel-I orders entail "only a minimal interim encroachment, if [any]
133. Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter formed the plurality. See Gourmet Foods, 116
L.R.R.M. at 1105.
134. Id. at 1111 (quoting H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970)).
135. The importance of majority rule was discussed by the Board at some length. The Board
read the legislative history to disclose a congressional intention to limit its authority to impose
bargaining orders, except in those cases where the union once had a majority. Gourmet Foods,
116 L.R.R.M. at 1112-13. The plurality opinion also discounted the effect of Chief Justice
Warren's dicta in Gissel, and adopted the rationale of Member Penello's dissenting opinion in
United Dairy Farmers, 242 N.L.R.B. at 1038-40. 116 L.R.R.M. at 1111.
136. Gourmet Foods, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1116-17.
137. Id. at 1114.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1118.
140. Id. To support his position, Zimmerman argued at some length that Chief Justice
Warren's Gissel opinion is not ambiguous and, in fact, means that the Board has Gissel-I
authority. Id. at 1118-19.
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at all" on majoritarian principles.14' Zimmerman claimed that the principle
of "absolute" majoritarianism was endangered by Board presumptions in
other areas and said that the risk to majority rule in Gourmet Foods'42 was
outweighed by the need to create an environment in which free choice might
prevail. 43
Whatever the motives of the present Board, Gourmet Foods cannot be
dismissed as merely another pro-management decision. The issues it raises
are central both to the policy of the Act and to effective enforcement of
that policy. No one doubts the importance of majority rule. The right to
choose a labor organization as an exclusive representative for collective
bargaining-the primary focus of the Act-is premised on the free choice
of the majority, a principle the Board cannot flout merely because the
remedial power in section 10(c) does not expressly refer to it.' 44 Decisions
that undermine majority rule, even though in pursuit of another legitimate
purpose, must be viewed with considerable suspicion.
On the other hand, the efficacy of the Board's remedial power is a
substantial concern. Although the Board has some discretion in fashioning
remedies, it is limited to imposing corrective action after a violation. The
typical remedy is a cease and desist order and, if appropriate, an order to
reinstate improperly discharged employees. 45 But even those remedies are
not self-executing; they depend for enforcement on the federal courts of
appeals, which sometimes disagree with the scope of the order, particularly
if the Board has fashioned a broader remedy than it usually does to deal
with unusually egregious offenses. 46 The Board's limited remedial power,
combined with its cumbersome enforcement procedures, produce real ad-
vantages for employers bent on avoiding collective bargaining. Employers
can use unlawful tactics to resist unionization efforts with little to fear from
the Board. Its remedies are not punitive and may not be enforced for a year
141. Id. at 1119. Zimmerman also observed that, while the Act expressly refers to majority
rule in several instances, none of those sections expressly limits the Board's remedial power
under § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). 116 L.R.R.M. at 1119-20. He also read the legislative history
to mean that "the principle of majority rule has been imposed on the Act as a limitation on coercion
by employers and unions of employee rights to free choice and self-organization, not as an absolute
limitation on the Board's ability to remedy such coercion." Id. at 1120.
142. For example, Zimmerman noted the irrebuttable presumption of majority status ac-
companying either a union election victory or voluntary recognition by the employer. Gourmet
Foods, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1120.
143. Zimmerman argued that the majority's decision denied to the Board a remedial tool of
great deterrent effect that would restore employee § 7 rights. Id. at 1121-22.
144. In dissent, Zimmerman argued that the Act's focus on majority rule did not necessarily
limit the Board's remedial power. Id. at 1119-20.
145. A complete discussion of the Board's remedy power is beyond the scope of this article.
For a more thorough discussion, see R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 95-101, 138-42, 532-39. See
also Bethel, Profiting From Unfair Labor Practices: A Proposal to Regulate Management
Representatives, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 506, 554-61 (1984).
146. See, e.g., A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 252-57 (9th
ed. 1981).
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or more. During that time, the organizational effort may have sputtered,
because of either employee intimidation or simply the protracted delay. In
either event, the employer has profited from its unlawful conduct. 47
The Board's trump card in these cases is the Gissel bargaining order. In
theory, these orders not only effectuate employee rights, they also deter
unlawful employer conduct. Until Conair, the Board had issued bargaining
orders only after finding that the union once had majority support and that
the employer's conduct undermined the union's strength. If both findings
are accurate, the Act's majoritarian principles are not sacrificed. Even though
the union's strength may have ebbed, it was the employer's coercive tactics-
and not the employees' free choice-that made the difference. The Gissel-II
order, in theory, merely restores the status quo. At the same time, it deters
the unlawful practices of other employers who know that they do not have
free rein to ignore employee section 7 rights. At some point, their coercive
tactics will be serious enough to warrant a bargaining order, thus depriving
them of the benefit of their coercive conduct.
The Gissel-I order carries the theory one step further. If the power to
impose bargaining orders can reach employers who have destroyed a union
majority, should it not also apply when an employer's coercive tactics prevent
the union from ever reaching a majority? Stated differently-and more
argumentatively-if employers understand that the Board can issue bargain-
ing orders only when the union once had majority support, won't that
knowledge prompt even more egregious conduct to ensure that the union
never achieves a card majority? And, to carry the argument farther, won't
that limitation on the Board's authority produce the anomaly of having
encouraged employer lawlessness which the Board is then powerless to remedy
effectively? Assuming the validity of NLRB behavioral assumptions, the
Gissel-I advocates make a strong case, at least in those instances where the
union once had significant employee support.14 Imposition of a bargaining
order would, in theory, normalize relations by giving employees some col-
lective strength against employer intimidation. The order deters outrageous
employer conduct by denying the desired advantage. And, interference with
majoritarian principles is slight since the union's representative status is not
permanent. Once the coercive atmosphere generated by the employer has
147. See, e.g., Bethel, supra note 145, at 606-13.
148. Although the Third Circuit relied on the extent of employee support in United Dairy
Farmers, 633 F.2d at 1069 n.16, that factor was not among the criteria approved by the Board
in Conair. The Board did note the probability that the union would have achieved a majority,
but it said:
We would not, however, necessarily withhold a bargaining order in the absence
of a close election vote, a high majority percentage card showing, or any other
affirmative showing of a reasonable basis for projecting a union's majority sup-
port. The critical predicate to issuance of a non-majority bargaining order is the
Board's finding ... that an employer's unlawful conduct fits the Gissel category
1 description.
Conair, 261 N.L.R.B. at 1194.
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abated, employees can, if they choose, decertify the union in an NLRB
election.
Both sides of the debate make compelling claims, and neither side nec-
essarily depends on a professed bias for management or labor. Both sides
do, however, depend on assumptions about the effect of employer cam-
paigning on employee behavior and about the efficacy of remedial bargaining
orders. Those assumptions are dubious enough when applied in support of
Gissel-II orders. The use of the remedy should not be extended to embrace
non-majority orders given the state of the Board's present knowledge.
B. Empirical Studies Completed
The most basic assumption underlying either the Gissel-I or Gissel-II order
is that unlawful employer campaign practices deter employee support for
the union. Although the assumption seems reasonable on its face, the only
significant empirical evidence is to the contrary. In Union Representation
Elections: Law and Reality, 49 Professors Getman and Goldberg studied
thirty-one election campaigns that included both unlawful and lawful cam-
paign tactics. The authors concluded that employees were generally inatten-
tive to election campaigns and that the most common employer unfair labor
practices (coercive speech, discriminatory discharge, interrogation, and prom-
ises of benefit) do not affect the way employees vote or their support for
the union. 50 The authors also concluded that unlawful campaigning is no
more effective than lawful campaigning (with neither mattering very much)
and urged the Board to "deregulate" NLRB election campaigns.' 5 '
To say that Board response has been restrained greatly understates the
fact. The Board has not addressed the study in any section 8(a)(3) cases,
and has ignored it in most section 8(a)(1) cases. The sole exception is in
campaign misrepresentation where, in two decisions, the majority and dis-
senting opinions debated the findings, although neither side appeared to
understand them. 52 The Board has not confronted the study in its imposition
of Gissel bargaining orders, prompting the conclusion that it has simply
rejected it, albeit silently, in favor of its own unverified behavioral assump-
tions.
149. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND
REALITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Getman Study].
150. Id. at 109.
151. Id.
152. The Board first considered the Getman Study, supra note 149, in Shopping Kart Food
Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977), and relied on it, in part to curtail its regulation of
campaign misrepresentation. A little more than a year later, the Board reversed Shopping Kart
in General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), with the members again disagreeing
over the significance of the Getman Study. For criticism of the Board's treatment of the study,
as well as a reaction to other criticism, see Goldberg, Getman & Brett, Union Representation
Elections: Law and Reality: The Authors Respond to the Critics, 79 MICH. L. REV. 564 (1981).
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In addition to the Getman study, another recent empirical project casts
doubt on the validity of an important assumption underlying Gissel The
typical bargaining order is premised on the union's once having had majority
status. The theory is that but for the employer's unlawful conduct, the union
would have maintained its majority and won the election. The Gissel-II
order, theoretically then, merely restores the status quo. In a recent article,
Professor Laura Cooper studied 750 NLRB elections conducted between
1978 and 1980 to test empirically the validity of the assumption that a union
obtaining authorization cards from a majority of the employees in a bar-
gaining unit is likely to win an NLRB conducted election. 153 She concluded
that a union with a bare majority of authorization cards (enough for a
Gissel-II order) is actually more likely to lose an election than win it. In
addition, even when union authorization cards are signed by 62.5 percent
of the employees, the union still has only an even chance of winning the
election. 5 4 Cooper's work obviously strikes at the heart of the Gissel order.
Evidence that a union with a substantial card majority is more likely to lose
than to win an election requires one to question the Board's assertion that
the bargaining order merely restores the union's status. It also undermines
the Board's claim that a Gissel-II order entails no sacrifice of majoritarian
principles.
Not only does the work of Getman and Cooper cast doubt on the as-
sumptions underlying Gissel, but many other commentators have criticized
the Board's action. 55 The typical complaint is that the Board has never
promulgated standards which indicate when an employer's conduct is serious
enough to warrant a bargaining order. 56 Rather, the Board merely lists the
employer's unfair labor practices and then recites a litany that the violations
are or are not serious enough to warrant an order. 57 Even a cursory review
of the cases confirms the validity of this criticism.' 58 Given the Board's
difficulty in making distinctions in Gissel-II cases, one must question whether
153. Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: An Empir-
ical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw.
U.L. REV. 87 (1984).
154. Id. at 137.
155. See, e.g., Note, Representative Bargaining Orders: A Time for Change, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 950, 958-63 (1982); Pogrebin, NLRB Bargaining Orders Since Gissel: Wandering From a
Landmark, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 193, 201-07 (1971).
156. See, e.g., Pogrebin, supra note 155, at 202-03.
157. See, e.g., J.J. Newberry Co. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1981), where the court
criticized the Board's Gissel policies, saying: "Rather than react in knee jerk fashion the Board
must still analyze the nature of the misconduct .... . Id. at 153.
158. Compare C & T Mfg. Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 1430 (1977) (threat of plant closure warranted
bargaining order) with Pardjiris Welmont Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 180 (1972) (several violations,
including threat of plant closure did not warrant bargaining order). See also United Oil Mfg.
Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1981) (§ 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) violations justified bargaining order
because coercive effect increased in small unit); House of Cycle, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1982)
(§ 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) violations did not warrant order, despite small bargaining unit).
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it could further refine the process to embrace the more difficult conditions
necessary for issuance of a Gissel-I order.
C. The Unanswered Question
Almost all of the criticism of Gissel to date has focused either on the
circumstances that must exist before a bargaining order is issued or on the
assumptions the Board uses to justify imposing an order. An equally pertinent
inquiry, however, is what effect Gissel bargaining orders have, an issue
raised by the Board for the first time in Gourmet Foods. 5 9 Unless bargaining
orders are used merely to punish employers (a power the Board does not
have), the Board must assume that the orders can lead to productive collective
bargaining relationships that protect the rights and interests of employees.
At the very least, the Board assumes that a Gissel bargaining relationship
will reestablish conditions in which employees can exercise a free choice and
that the employees can (and will) decertify the union if they do not desire
representation.
In order to prove the validity of these assumptions, several questions must
be answered. (1) Do bargaining order unions retain their majority status?
If so, for how long? How does their experience compare to that of elected
unions? (2) How do bargaining order unions lose their representative status?
Decertification? Abandonment? Rival unions? How do their experiences
compare to those of elected unions? (3) How much employee support do
bargaining order unions enjoy? How does their support compare to their
pre-election card-based strength? How do these results compare to the ex-
perience of elected unions? (4) How often are bargaining order unions
successful in negotiating labor contracts with employers? How do key fea-
tures of the agreements (i.e., wages, grievance-arbitration provisions, sen-
iority) compare to those contracts negotiated by elected unions? (5) How
do employees feel about having a bargaining agent thrust upon them? Do
they understand what has happened? Do they understand that they have the
right to decertify the union? How do employers (and their negotiators) view
bargaining order unions? How do those attitudes compare to their view of
elected unions?
This list of questions is not exhaustive. It does, however, point out a
basic deficiency in the Board's knowledge. How can the NLRB justify
imposing an order to bargain, with the resulting danger to majoritarian
principles, when it knows nothing about the effect of its orders? How can
it claim that Gissel orders prevent employers from profiting from their unfair
labor practices? It may be that Gissel bargaining order unions, in fact, never
bargain at all or, if they do, are so weak as to be virtually impotent. In
that case, the Gissel order will have done little, if anything, to remedy the
159. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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employer's unlawful conduct. Although much work remains to be done, the
little empirical evidence that exists refutes the Board's image of Gissel as
an effective means of restoring employee rights.' 6°
Gourmet Foods, like Conair before it, produced opinions in which both
sides discussed at length their unverified assumptions and what Chief Justice
Warren really meant in GisseL The time has come to stop arguing about
that opinion. It does not answer the question and cannot. Given the existing
empirical data generated thus far, and the many questions which abound
concerning the effect of the Board's remedial policy, it is difficult to justify
the use of Gissel-II bargaining orders. Until the Board learns something
about the effect of its actions, it is foolhardy to expand the scope of the
remedy. The principle of majority rule is too important to be overcome on
the basis of conjecture. Only a systematic study of the effect of Gissel
bargaining orders will justify Board expansion of that remedy to embrace
minority unions.
III. DUTY TO BARGAIN
A. Otis Elevator
Since 1964, Board members have debated whether the effect of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB16' is
to require bargaining about such management decisions as complete or partial
closings, relocations, mergers, automation, and the like.'6 In 1981, the
Supreme Court reentered the fray, deciding in First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB'6 that a partial closing is not a mandatory subject for
bargaining. Recently, in Otis Elevator Co.,' 64 the Board fashioned a test
designed to apply the holding of First National Maintenance to other kinds
of business decisions. Although the four Board members do not agree on
160. In addition to the Cooper study, supra note 153, there have been three other attempts
to test empirically the assumptions underlying the Gissel bargaining order. In Wolkinson, The
Remedial Efficacy of NLRB Remedies in Joy Silk Cases, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1969), the
author studied the success rate of bargaining order unions in obtaining contracts. He determined
that in cases that would today warrant a Gissel order (the study preceded GisseO), the union
settled a contract in 38% of its cases. In addition, in 1983 the AFL-CIO organizing department
compared the success rate of its affiliated bargaining order unions to those affiliated unions
achieving representative status through more traditional means. The results showed that bar-
gaining order unions were successful only 28% of the time, compared to a 63% success rate
for other unions. Letter from Charles McDonald to AFL-CIO National Organizing Committee
(Feb. 18, 1983) (copy on file with author). Finally, in an unpublished study, O'Shea, Gissel
Bargaining Orders (copy on file with author), the author conducted non-scientific study of
bargaining order union success. She found that such unions achieve a contract only 37% of
the time.
161. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
162. See, e.g., Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
163. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
164. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
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a common rationale, the effect of their action is to narrow considerably the
decisions subject to mandatory collective bargaining.
In Fibreboard, the Court found that an employer's decision to subcontract
maintenance work was a mandatory subject for bargaining, noting that the
employer had done little more than substitute one group of employees for
another and that the new employees would perform the same work under
essentially the same conditions. The Court claimed that its decision interfered
with no significant management perogatives because the company's basic
operation was not altered and no capital investment was involved.' 65 The
Court, however, also justified its action with much broader language. It
stated that the subcontracting decision necessarily terminated employment,
therefore making it a "term and condition of employment" within the
meaning of section 8(d) of the Act. 66 Moreover, the Court said that bar-
gaining would effectuate the purposes of the Act, one of which was to
"promote the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes....
Although agreeing with the Court's decision, Justice Stewart wrote a
concurring opinion in which he expressed concern that the Court's opinion
was unnecessarily broad and would unduly expand the range of bargainable
decisions. 168 Justice Stewart took pains to narrow the effect of the Court's
opinion, using language that has become nearly as important as that used
by the majority:
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty
to bargain collectively regarding . . . managerial decisions, which lie at
the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment
of investment capital and the basic scope of enterprise are not in them-
selves primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of
the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment. If, as I think
clear, the purpose of section 8(d) is to describe a limited area subject to
the duty of collective bargaining, those management decisions which are
fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which
impinge only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded
from that area. 69
Following Fibreboard, the Board often issued decisions expanding con-
siderably the obligation of management to bargain about matters traditionally
165. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213.
166. Id. at 210. In pertinent part, section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), defines the
obligation to "bargain collectively" as the "mutual obligation of the employers and the rep-
resentatives of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment ...." Similarly, section 9(a),
29 U.S.C. § 159(a), provides that a union selected by a majority of the employees is the
"exclusive representative ... for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .... The question
raised by Fibreboard and similar cases is whether certain management decisions are "terms or
conditions of employment" and therefore mandatory subjects of bargaining. For a more detailed
review, see generally R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 509-23.
167. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 210-11.
168. Id. at 218.
169. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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thought to be solely within its domain.'70 While the Board used the Fibre-
board majority opinion to support those decisions, the courts of appeals
adopted a more restrained approach, often finding support in Stewart's
opinion.'7'
In First National Maintenance, the Supreme Court itself backed away
from the broad language of the Fibreboard majority opinion. The Court
noted that while the Board often makes decisions concerning mandatory
bargaining subjects, most of the dispute under Fibreboard has revolved
around management decisions that have a direct impact on employment, but
that have as their principal focus the economic profitability of the em-
ployer.' 72 In holding that an employer's decision to close part of its business
was not bargainable, the Court adopted a new test:
Management must be free from the constraints of the bargaining
process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business.
It must also have some degree of certainty beforehand as to when it
may proceed to reach decisions without fear of later evaluations labeling
its conduct an unfair labor practice .... [I]n view of an employer's need
for unencumbered decision making, bargaining over management deci-
sions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of
employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management
relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden
placed on the conduct of the business.'"
In applying this test to partial closings, the Court tipped the scales in favor
of management. It said that the union's sole interest was job security, which
will ordinarily prompt it to delay or stop the closing. Although the Court
noted that the union might be motivated to offer concessions, it concluded
that decision bargaining would not "augment this flow of information and
suggestions,"' 74 finding it sufficient that employers might have incentive to
seek such discussions in required "effects bargaining."'' 75
On the other hand, management's interests were deemd "much more
complex" and dependent on the particular circumstances of each case. Man-
agement, for example, might need speed, flexibility, or security, encounter
tax or securities problems, or have no feasible alternative to its chosen course
of action. 76 Although none of these factors were necessarily at issue in the
case, the Court proceeded to adopt a virtual per se rule that "[tihe harm
likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether
to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the
170. See, e.g., Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966). See generally R. GORMAN,
supra note 4.
171. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See
generally R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 162.
172. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677.
173. Id. at 679.
174. Id. at 681.
175. Id. at 681-82.
176. Id. at 682-83.
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incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's participation
in making the decision. . .. ,,1'7 In short, the Court decided that employers
were not required to bargain about decisions to close part of the business
because such disputes are not "amenable to resolution through the bargaining
process. 1 1 78 The Supreme Court noted that its decision resolved only the
question of whether partial closings were bargainable:
We, of course, intimate no view as to other types of management
decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting,
automation, etc., which are to be considered on their particular facts.'1'
The Board's initial reaction to First National Maintenance was resistance.
In its first decision following the case, for example, the Board manipulated
the facts and found the label placed on the transaction determinative.8 0
Characterizing an employer's decision to terminate part of its business as
subcontracting, the Board decided that-Fibreboard required bargaining, al-
though the same facts could just as easily have been viewed as a partial
closing and therefore not bargainable under First National Maintenance.'"
Transparent as that decision seemed, however, it was not without precedent.
Prior decisions of both the Board and the courts of appeals had turned on
whether the transaction was characterized as subcontracting, relocating, or
a partial closing'8 2 (bargainable, at least until First National Maintenance)
or as a complete termination or sale (not bargainable).'8 3 Although not
unanimous, the Board's recent decision in Otis apparently rejects a test based
on labels and purports to resolve the question of which disputes are "ame-
nable to the bargaining process" by focusing on the motivation for the
decision.
At issue in Otis was the employer's decision to centralize its research and
development facilities. The decision involved the transfer of seventeen em-
ployees represented by the UAW from Mahwah, New Jersey, to East Hart-
ford, Connecticut. The Board found that the company had acted because
177. Id. at 686.
178. Id. at 678.
179. Id. at 686 n.22.
180. See Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurants, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982).
181. The case involved an employer's decision to close its shrimp processing operation. The
Board decided that the change was not a partial closing, because the employer continued to
process other foods. Id. at 1371. Rather, the majority characterized the change as subcontracting
(because the employer purchased processed shrimp from other businesses after eliminating its
processing capability) which was bargainable under Fibreboard. Id. at 1371-72. It is clear,
however, that the case did not involve the type of subcontracting at issue in Fibreboard, because
in that case the Court noted that the subcontractor's employees would do the same work
previously done by the terminated employees, in the same place, under essentially the same
employment conditions. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213.
182. See, e.g., Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (partial closing is bargainable);
Kroneuberger, 206 N.L.R.B. 534 (1973) (subcontracting decision bargainable).
183. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (sale
not bargainable); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polish Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965) (partial
closing not bargainable).
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the Mahwah facility was outdated and its work was duplicated elsewhere.
Also, the company's technology had failed to keep pace, causing it to sell
its products at a loss. As a part of the transfer, the company constructed
a new 2.5 to 3.0 million dollar research center in East Hartford. The company
hoped that the new facility would revitalize its research and development
effort.'8
The Board initially decided the case in 1981, before the Supreme Court's
decision in First National Maintenance. 85 Rejecting employer claims that an
order to bargain would significantly abridge its "freedom to invest its capital
and manage its business,' ' 86 the Board said that the investment was not
"the type of shift of assets we have found to be outside the scope of
mandatory subjects for bargaining" and concluded that there was no "basic
capital reorganization."' 8 7 Although it did not decide the case expressly on
the basis of the transaction label, the Board's analysis was similar to cases
that had. It quoted from a previous case that had held a transaction bar-
gainable because it did not involve a "termination, relocation, liquidation,"
a sale or a "significant" capital transaction. 8 8 The Board did not explain
why the employer's consolidation of its research facility and its $2.5 to $3
million expenditure was not a significant capital investment, although it
conceded that such a sum was a "fairly large amount" of money. It seemed
most concerned that there had been neither a conveyance of assets nor a
termination of activities. 89
The Board's recent decision in Otis resulted from a remand by the court
of appeals to reconsider the case in light of First National Maintenance.
The four members produced three opinions. Chairman Dotson and Member
Hunter asserted that the "critical factor" in determining whether a man-
agement decision is bargainable is the "essence of the decision itself."'' 9
They argued that the effect on the employees is not conclusive (thereby
implicitly rejecting the broad rationale of Fibreboard), but that the deter-
minative question is whether the decision is a "change in the nature or
direction of the business or turns on labor costs."'' Only decisions which
are motivated principally by management's desire to reduce the cost of labor
are bargainable.
184. Otis, 269 N.L.R.B. at 892.
185. The prior opinion is reported at 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981). The Board asked the D.C.
Circuit to remand the case for reconsideration. Otis, 269 N.L.R.B. at 891.
186. Otis (1), 255 N.L.R.B. at 236.
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting International Harvester Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 712 (1978)).
189. The Board wrote: "Respondent has not . . . undergone a basic capital reorganization
whereby it has conveyed any portion of its assets or operations to some other entity. Nor is
there evidence that Respondent has terminated any of its holdings in achieving its objectives."
255 N.L.R.B. at 236.
190. Otis, 269 N.L.R.B. at 892.
191. Id. The plurality placed particular emphasis on the rationale of Justice Stewart's con-
curring opinion in Fibreboard, quoted in part supra text accompanying note 169.
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In a concurring opinion, Member Zimmerman agreed that the decision to
relocate Otis' research facilities was not bargainable. His statement of the
test, however, was broader than that of Dotson and Hunter: "I will find
bargaining over an employer's decision to relocate work to be mandatory
when the decision is amenable to resolution through the collective bargaining
process."' 92 Whether that test is met depends on an analysis of the employer's
reseasons for its action. A decision based on the efficiency criteria in Otis
is not bargainable because the union could not reasonably expect to offer
concessions that would meet the employer's needs. A decision motivated by
labor costs, on the other hand, is amenable to resolution through collective
bargaining because the union can offer concessions to alleviate the problem. 93
Unlike Dotson and Hunter, however, Zimmerman did not limit his decision
to labor costs: "A decision may be amenable to resolution through bargaining
where the employer's decision is related to overall enterprise costs not limited
specifically to labor costs.' ' 94 In those situations, presumably the union
might be able to offer cost savings that would alleviate an employer's
financial problems. Member Dennis concurred in the result, but adopted a
test based on her reading of First National Maintenance. '95
Although Dotson, Hunter and Zimmerman agree on the result in Otis,
and although the tests they apply are similar, there are significant differences.
In addition to their narrower interpretation of "amenability," Dotson and
Hunter venture far beyond the facts of Otis. Relying on the language quoted
above from First National Maintenance and on Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Fibreboard, they "hold" that there is no obligation to bargain
about decisions that "affect the scope, direction, or nature of the business,"
including:
[d]ecisions to sell a business or a part thereof, to dispose of its assets,
to restructure or to consolidate operations, to subcontract, to invest in
labor-saving machinery, to change the methods of finance or of sales,
advertising, product design, and all other decisions akin to the forego-
ing.l1%
192. Otis, 269 N.L.R.B. at 900.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 900-01.
195. The longest opinion was produced by Member Dennis, who expressly rejected the Dotson-
Hunter approach and relied on her own analysis of First National Maintenance which she
reviewed in considerable detail. Id. at 895-900. Dennis fashioned a two-part test. First, like
her colleagues, she asked whether the decision is amenable to resolution through the collective
bargaining process. The answer, she said, depends on whether some factor over which the
union has control is "a significant consideration" in the decision, a criterion which is met if
some union concession could make a difference to the employer's decision. If the answer is
no, bargaining is not required. Id. at 897. Thus far, the test appears identical to that proposed
by Zimmerman, and therefore similar to the Dotson-Hunter formulation. If the answer is yes,
however, Dennis carries the analysis a step farther and weighs the "benefit" of bargaining
against the "burden" that such negotiations would place on the conduct of the business. Id.
196. Id. at 893 n.5.
[Vol. 60:227
RECENT NLRB DECISIONS
What is bargainable are those decisions that turn on "direct modification
of labor costs." It is that single inquiry which is crucial, and not whether
the transaction is characterized as "subcontracting, reorganization, consol-
idation, or relocation .. ."97
This plurality "holding" creates some confusion. On one hand, the plu-
rality asserts that the reason for a decision, not the label applied to a
transaction, settles the bargaining issue. At the same time, however, the
opinion lists a number of transactions that are excludable from bargaining
because they affect the direction of the business. Presumably, the list merely
includes transactions in which the motive may have been (or typically would
be) other than to save labor costs. For example, subcontracting and con-
solidations are included in the list, but are also mentioned as situations where
bargaining can be required if the decision turns on labor costs. The opinion
is not clear, however, because the list of nonbargainable transactions includes
matters such as advertising and methods of financing or sales which are
universally agreed to be management prerogatives beyond the pale of col-
lective bargaining. 98 It seems unlikely that those decisions would ever be
bargainable, thereby creating the inference that all of the decisions on the
plurality's list are non-bargainable. However, because Dotson and Hunter
profess to be guided by analysis rather than labels, at least some of the
decisions they list appear to be bargainable if they are motivated by labor
costs, although it is not clear which ones.
The plurality opinion is also narrower than it may first appear. Dotson
and Hunter believe decisions are bargainable if they "turn on" labor costs.
That criterion is not satisfied if labor costs are merely one factor in the
decision. The opinion recognizes that "these decisions do not fit neatly into
categories" and that labor costs may merely be among the considerations
that motivate management decisions.199 Noting that in First National Main-
tenance the Court said "if labor costs are an important factor ... man-
agement will have an incentive to confer voluntarily with the union to seek
concessions" during effects bargaining, the plurality said, "[w]e discern no
substantial reason why this analysis is not equally applicable to other de-
cision[s] which turn upon a significant change in the nature or direction of
a business. ' 200 Although not free from ambiguity, this statement appears to
mean that if labor costs are merely among the concerns prompting a man-
agerial decision, discussion of them is voluntary, undertaken in effects bar-
gaining. However, if the decision actually "turns on" labor costs (apparently
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 676-77, where, in discussing the range
of bargainable decisions, the Court said: "[S]ome management decisions, such as choice of
advertising, product type or design, and financing arrangement, have only an indirect and
attenuated impact on the employment relationship."
199. Otis, 269 N.L.R.B. at 894.
200. Id.
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to the exclusion of other considerations), it is amenable to the bargaining
process and is therefore a mandatory subject for bargaining. 20'
Although the case has not received a warm reception from labor,2 2 the
actual holding in Otis is not unreasonable. The test adopted by the Supreme
Court in First National Maintenance is whether management's decisions are
amenable to the bargaining process. As all four members of the Board
concluded, given the employer's motivation in Otis, bargaining was unlikely
to have produced a compromise. The factors prompting the decision were
beyond the control, or even the influence, of the union. Otis, however, is
not free from controversy. The plurality's interpretation that managerial
decisions are amenable to the bargaining process only if they depend almost
exclusively on labor costs is much too narrow. An employer might be
motivated to relocate a plant, consolidate operations, or purchase labor
saving machinery because of production inefficiencies unrelated to the actual
cost of labor. All the unions ask is the opportunity to explore with man-
agement the possibility of concessions or other contract modifications that
might ease the employer's financial problems and change, or at least
postpone, a decision that eliminates jobs. Although such matters can be
discussed in effects bargaining, 23 the option rests with the employer and, in
any event, the union's opportunity to affect the decision might be lessened
significantly after it has been made and implementation begun.
As a practical matter, one must also question whether the plurality test
will often result in an order to bargain. As previously noted, bargaining is
necessary only in those situations where labor costs are the primary moti-
vation of management. Little imagination is required to characterize a de-
cision as depending on factors other than, or in addition to, labor costs.
Any consolidation of operations, for example, can be cast as a decision
designed to promote management efficiency or to effect cost savings unre-
lated to actual labor costs. In such cases, even if labor costs are one factor,
the decision becomes a permissive bargaining subject. Ironically, then, the
Otis opinion purportedly avoids the manipulation of transaction labels to
create a bargaining obligation but creates the opportunity to achieve the
same result by manipulating motive. 204
201. Zimmerman did not expressly enter the debate about application of his test to other
transactions. He merely concluded that the employer's decision to "relocate work" was bar-
gainable. Id. at 900. In theory, however, his test would apply to other transactions that are
motivated by cost savings and that affect the employment security of employees.
202. See, e.g., Logothetis, Summary of Recent Significance Decisions of the National Labor
Relations Board: The Union Perspective, 1984 Course Manual, Midwest Labor Law Conference
(copy on file with author).
203. Even if employers are not required to bargain about business decisions, the Board has
interpreted the Act to require bargaining over the effect of these decisions on employees. See
First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681 ("There is no dispute that the union must be
given a significant opportunity to bargain about these matters of job security as part of the
'effects' bargaining mandated by § 8(a)(5)").
204. Interestingly, Dotson and Hunter joined the majority opinion in Milwaukee Springs
(I), 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), which predicted that if employers were prohibited from mid-
term relocations of work when based on labor costs, they would be unlikely to admit that such
costs were part of their motivation. Id. at 605. It is hard to understand why employers would
be more likely to admit that labor costs prompted a decision when the consequence will be an
obligation to bargain.
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The test proposed by Zimmerman is better designed to accommodate the
interests of both employees and employers. It recognizes that union conces-
sions might satisfy the financial concerns of management, even if labor costs
did not precipitate the problem. Zimmerman's test is also harder to evade-
it is more difficult to disguise a decision based on cost than it is to attribute
the cost problem to some factor other than, or in addition to, labor. Finally,
Zimmerman's test accommodates the concern for certainty voiced by the
Court in First National Maintenance. Either decisions are motivated by cost
or they are not. If they are, the bargaining obligation is as readily apparent
under Zimmermai's test as under the test promulgated by the plurality.2 5
B. Milwaukee Springs
As was true with Otis, the Board's decision in Milwaukee Springs Division
of Illinois Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Springs (II)) 2°6 reversed a previous
decision issued in the same case.207 The employer's only unionized division
(Milwaukee) was party to a contract with the United Auto Workers (UAW)
from April, 1980 until March, 1983. In early 1982, the employer asked the
union to give up a wage increase scheduled for April and to make certain
other concessions. By March, the employer's financial condition had wors-
ened, due in part to the loss of a major customer. At that time, the employer
proposed transferring its Milwaukee assembly operation to a nonunion fa-
cility in McHenry, Illinois, a move that would affect approximately one
third of the bargaining unit employees. Alternatively, the employer proposed
a document entitled "terms upon which Milwaukee assembly operations will
be retained in Milwaukee," detailing significant wage and benefit cuts. The
union refused to make any concessions, and the company announced its
decision to relocate. 20 8
The parties stipulated that the employer's decision was not motivated by
anti-union animus, but rather was prompted solely by comparatively higher
labor costs under the collective bargaining agreement. They also stipulated
that the employer had satisfied its obligation to bargain over the decision
and was willing to bargain over the effects of the decision. 209
In 1982, a three-member Board panel, including an early Reagan ap-
pointee, decided that the employer's transfer of work during the term of
the contract violated sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5). The principal hold-
ing was the section 8(a)(5) violation, which was premised on the Board's
205. For the General Counsel's interpretation of Otis, see Office of the General Counsel
Memorandum GC-12 (June 14, 1984) 116 LAB. REL. REP. 186 (July 9, 1984).
206. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (supplementing 265 N.L.R.B. 206).
207. The first opinion, Milwaukee Springs (I), is reported at 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982). As
was true in Otis, the court of appeals remanded the case at the Board's request. Milwaukee
Springs (II), 268 N.L.R.B. at 601.
208. Milwaukee Springs (II), 268 N.L.R.B. at 601.
209. Id.
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conclusion that the employer had unlawfully modified the collective bar-
gaining agreement contrary to the terms and policy of section 8(d). 211 That
section of the Act defines the duty to bargain in good faith and provides,
in part:
The duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party
to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions
contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to
become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under
the provisions of the contract.21'
Under section 8(d), the Board has held unilateral midterm modifications of
provisions "contained in" a contract to be unlawful, even though the em-
ployer has offered to bargain about the change and even though the parties
have actually bargained to impasse.
21 2
The Board found such an unlawful modification in Milwaukee Springs
(I), although it did not specify exactly which term "contained in" the contract
had been modified. The inference is strong, however, that the Board viewed
the case as a modification of the contract's wage schedules since it noted
that the collective bargaining agreement had not expired and that the em-
ployer was motivated to act because of higher wage levels in Milwaukee
than in McHenry. 213 The Board also relied on Los Angeles Marine Hardware
Co., 214 where, as in Milwaukee Springs, the employer had relocated opera-
tions from a unionized plant to a nonunionized plant for economic reasons
during the term of the contract.
In Los Angeles Marine, the Board upheld the decision of an administrative
law judge finding the relocation to violate the policy of section 8(d) and,
therefore, the terms of section 8(a)(5). Concluding that section 8(d) does
not permit an employer to "in effect, tear up" 2151 a contract that has proved
unprofitable, the ALJ said, in part:
This mandate [of section 8(d)] is not excused either by subjective good
faith or by the economic necessity of maintaining viability of an em-
210. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Although the Board also found a violation of § 8(a)(3), it
reasoned that the employer's violation of § 8(a)(5) was inherently destructive of employee rights
and therefore, under the rationale of NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967),
violated § 8(a)(3) as well. Milwaukee Springs (I), 265 N.L.R.B. at 208. The § 8(a)(3) violation,
then, depended on the Board's conclusion that the employer's transfer of work also violated
§ 8(a)(5).
211. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
212. See, e.g., Oakcliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1064 (1973), enforced, 505
F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975); C & S Industries, Inc., 158
N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977).
Although employers are required to bargain about "wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment," section 8(d) (the mandatory bargaining subjects), the bargaining require-
ment is satisfied if the employer, in good faith, negotiates to impass. Stated differently, employers
are free to act unilaterally with respect to mandatory bargaining subjects if they first bargain
to impasse. See generally R. GomAaN, supra note 4, at 445-50.
213. Milwaukee Springs (I), 265 N.L.R.B. at 208-09.
214. 235 N.L.R.B. at 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
215. 235 N.L.R.B. at 737.
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ployer's operation and perserving the jobs of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit. . . . [A]n employer is not free, without union consent, to
make midterm modifications in wage rates ... nor to replace all unit
employees .... [T]o permit relocation alone to vary this result would
mean that employers would be permitted to achieve by indirection that
which [they are] denied the opportunity to achieve by direct means .... 216
The Board found this same analysis controlling in Milwaukee Springs (I).217
In addition, the Board rejected the employer's contentions that the union
had waived its right to object to the move, or that the employer was free
to relocate (after bargaining) where such action was not expressly prohibited
by the contract. 2 8 The Board noted that contractual waivers must appear
in clear and unmistakable terms, 21 9 a requirement it found lacking. Neither
the management's rights clause (which the Board called a "general reser-
vation" of rights to decide "whether, and how, its product will be manu-
factured") nor the recognition clause (which recognized the union as
representative of employees located at a particular address in Milwaukee) were
sufficient to constitute a valid waiver. 220 Interestingly, the Board discounted
the effect of the recognition clause, saying that it was merely descriptive of
the employer's location at the time the contract was executed. It did not,
as the employer contended, mean that the contract terms bound the employer
only if it decided to remain in Milwaukee; and, therefore, was not a waiver
of the union's right to object to the move.221
In August, 1983, following oral argument before the Seventh Circuit, the
Board asked the court to remand the case for reconsideration. Given its
request for remand and the significant change in membership, the Board's
reversal of position in Milwaukee Springs (II) was no surprise.
The majority (comprised of all three Reagan appointees) focused on the
precise language of section 8(d) which prohibits unilateral modification dur-
ing the contract term of specific provisions "contained in" the contract. It
also observed that a party may demand negotiations over a mandatory
bargaining subject not "contained in" the contract and may even act uni-
laterally once the bargaining obligation has been satisfied. Applying those
principles, the Board criticized Milwaukee Springs (I) for never identifying
which specific term "contained in" the contract the employer had changed.2 2
The majority said that the employer had not changed the wage provisions
even though it had proposed modifications. When the union refused to
bargain, the employer simply abandoned its wage proposals and transferred
the work elsewhere, leaving the wage and benefit levels at Milwaukee un-
216. Id. at 735.
217. 265 N.L.R.B. at 208.
218. Id. at 209-10.
219. Id. at 209. Concerning contractual waiver of § 7 rights, see Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964).
220. Milwaukee Springs (I), 265 N.L.R.B. at 209-10.
221. Id. at 210.
222. Milwaukee Springs (II), 268 N.L.R.B. at 602.
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disturbed. 223 Nor did the employer's action modify the recognition clause,
which could not be interpreted to mean that the work performed by the
Milwaukee unit had to remain in Milwaukee. 224 The only contract provisions
that could have been modified unilaterally by the employer's action was a
work preservation clause requiring that the assembly operations remain in
Milwaukee, a requirement for which the majority said it searched "in vain." '
The lack of a work preservation clause (which the majority refused to
imply from the mere existence of a wage scale) not only absolved the employer
of any charge of unilateral modification of a term "contained in" the
contract. Since there was no contract term forbidding relocation, the agree-
ment did not waive the parties' obligation to bargain about any such pro-
posal. 226 Thus, the employer was permitted to propose relocation, bargain
to impasse, and then unilaterally move the work to another facility. 722 Not
only was this result supported by case law, said the Board, but it was also
consistent with the policy of the National Labor Relations Act favoring
resolution of disputes by collective bargaining. 228 Calling Milwaukee Springs
(I) a "radical departure" from the Board's previous approach to collective
bargaining, two members charged that the decision had added a term to the
contract without agreement from the parties and had foreclosed "the exercise
of rational economic discussion" which would benefit both labor and man-
agement. 229
The majority also overruled Los Angeles Marine, noting that the employer
had not achieved by indirection what it could not do directly, but had done
"directly and lawfully what can be done directly. ' 230 The majority said that
Los Angeles Marine had actually been based on a misreading of a previous
case that had dealt not with work relocations but with reassignments. 2 ' Two
members, however, said that both relocations and reassignments should be
treated the same:
[U]nless transfers are specifically prohibited by the bargaining agree-
ment, an employer is free to transfer work out of the bargaining unit
if: (1) the employer complies with Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB
... by bargaining in good faith to impasse; and (2) the employer is not
motivated by anti-union animus .... 232
223. Id. at 602.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 603.
227. Id. at 604.
228. Id. at 603.
229. Id. Member Dennis declined to join this part of the opinion, leaving Dotson and Hunter
as the plurality. Id. at 603 n.1 1.
230. Id. at 604 n.13.
231. The majority referred to University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. 190, enforcement denied,
514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975), which had been relied on in Los Angeles Marine. Milwaukee
Springs (1I), 268 N.L.R.B. at 604.
232. Milwaukee Springs (11), 268 N.L.R.B. at 604. Member Hunter did not join this analysis,
although he did agree that Los Angeles Marine should be overruled. Id. at 604 n.14.
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Finally, the majority claimed that its decision would promote "realistic
and meaningful collective bargaining." It asserted that Milwaukee Springs
(I), which prohibited mid-term relocations based on labor costs, would
encourage employers to conceal the reason for their action as a way of
escaping the contours of the decision.?3 Interestingly, the same Board mem-
bers decided Otis, which mandates bargaining over certain decisions (in-
cluding relocations) only if prompted by labor costs, without mentioning
the likelihood that employers might conceal their motive.234 Nonetheless, the
Board said that its new decision would give employers incentive to disclose
both their intentions and their true motive, thereby making it more likely
that real concession bargaining could occur.235
More than half of Zimmerman's dissenting opinion explains his reason
for holding the employer's relocation decision to be a mandatory subject
for bargaining, a requirement assumed by the majority. 2 6 Although he found
such decisions bargainable, Zimmerman said that when an employer's mo-
tives are economic, it can relocate during the contract term only with union
consent. Zimmerman's rationale echoed the Board's analysis in Los Angeles
Marine. Thus, he concluded that an employer could not lawfully change a
wage rate during the contract term without the union's consent, even if the
parties had bargained on the matter to impasse. However, "respondent's
decision to relocate the assembly work ... would achieve the same result,
albeit indirectly: its employees would continue to perform the assembly work
but at reduced wage rates." '237 Zimmerman argued that having voluntarily
agreed to pay a specified wage rate for assembly workers during a specified
term, the employer could not avoid that obligation either by unilaterally
reducing the wage or relocating the work. He scoffed at the majority's
assertion that the employer had not disturbed the assembly wage rates in
Milwaukee, observing that because there were no longer any assembly em-
ployees there, the matter was "without legal significance." 23s
Zimmerman also denied the majority's charge that the effect of his decision
would be to imply a work preservation clause in all contracts. Zimmerman
argued that section 8(d) prohibited unilateral mid-term work relocations only
when the employer's motive was to avoid a contractual term, such as the
wage schedule. 239 Work preservation clauses, on the other hand, would
233. Id. at 605.
234. See supra note 204.
235. Milwaukee Springs (I), 268 N.L.R.B. at 605.
236. Id. at 605-09. Milwaukee Springs (II) was decided before Otis Elevator. The majority
found it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the relocation was a mandatory bargaining
subject, relying instead on the parties' stipulation on the issue. Id. at 601 n.5.
237. Id. at 610.
238. Id. at 611.
239. Moreover, Zimmerman said that the mere fact that the employer's reasons for a work
transfer are economic does not necessarily mean that the employer was motivated to avoid a
contract term. Only if the motivation is contract avoidance is the employer prohibited from
unilateral action under Zimmerman's analysis. Id. at 611 n.19.
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prohibit the transfer of work for any reason during the term of the contract.
However, Zimmerman agreed with his colleagues that a mid-term relocation
did not violate a recognition clause, which he viewed as merely a description
of the physical location of the employer's plant.240 Finally, Zimmerman
denied that his approach would encourage employers to disguise their mo-
tives. He speculated that employers would bargain willingly, as the employer
had done in Milwaukee Springs, in order to achieve concessions. However,
even if the majority's prediction is correct, Zimmerman said that section
8(d) prohibits unilateral mid-term relocation and "the Board may not un-
dermine the statutory scheme merely because some violators of the Act may
not be brought to justice. ' '241
Each of the opinions in Milwaukee Springs appears to have been influenced
by a different characterization of the facts. From the union's standpoint,
there is no obligation to bargain about contractual wage rates during the
contract term. Nor can management unilaterally impose wage cuts. A re-
location of work that accomplishes the same thing, therefore, violates the
policy of section 8(d). The majority, however, characterized the case not as
an attempt by management to force bargaining over wage rates, but as a
proposal to relocate certain work. Because there is no contract clause pro-
hibiting a relocation and because such matters are bargainable if based on
labor costs, the employer can force bargaining during the contract term and,
failing agreement with the union, can unilaterally implement its decision.
Although the majority's syllogism appears unassailable, its underlying
premise is specious. The facts do not justify the conclusion that the employer
merely exercised its right to force bargaining and then acted unilaterally over
a subject not "contained in" the contract. Management did propose a
relocation, a matter not "contained in" the collective bargaining agreement.
However, management did not desire to relocate merely for the sake of
efficiency or for some other reason over which it had retained entrepreneurial
control. It stipulated that its sole motivation was avoidance of the contractual
wage rates, a matter over which it did not have unilateral control or entre-
preneurial freedom. The proposed relocation, then, was a bargaining chip
played against the union and, ultimately, cashed in. The employer proposed
the relocation in an effort to force contract wage concessions from the union
and, after the negotiations failed, it implemented the proposal. Merely char-
acterizing management's action as a proposal over a matter not "contained
in" the contract obscures what actually happened.
Even the majority opinion concedes that no party to a collective bargaining
agreement need bargain during the contract term over any mandatory bar-
gaining subject contained in the contract. The union, then, was free to reject
240. Id. at 611.
241. Id. at 612. If the employer's reasons are both related to and unrelated to contract
avoidance, Zimmerman would find a violation only if the contract avoidance reasons are
dominant. Id. at 612 n.21.
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any discussion of wage concessions without fear of violating either section
8(d) or section 8(b)(3). Moreover, while management had the right to suggest
voluntary negotiation, it had no right to force the union into wage nego-
tiations.4 2 However, that is exactly what it did. Recognizing that it could
not force renegotiation of wages, the employer proposed a relocation based
on economic concerns. The union's only means to dissuade the employer
from its proposal was to modify wages, thus requiring it to discuss a subject
"contained in" the contract, the same discussion the employer had been
unable to force directly.
The Board's myopic view of the facts obscured the real issue. Rather than
having asked what "specific term" the employer modified, the majority
should have considered the motive of the employer in proposing the relo-
cation. Although the employer did not "change" the terms of the contract
at the Milwaukee plant, it used the threatened relocation to force the union
to bargain over proposed concessions. After not being able to achieve success
in those negotiations, the employer moved. Because the move was motivated
by union invocation of its right to refuse negotiations, there is no clearer
example of a violation of the policy of section 8(d). Although the majority's
decision in Milwaukee Springs (I) rested on some erroneous arguments, its
result was clearly correct. The Board's retreat in Milwaukee Springs (II)
undermines the stability of contracts by giving employers the unfettered right
to force mid-term contract renegotiations.
IV. DISTRIBUTION AND SOLICITATION
Our Way, Inc.
Among the other recent decisions reversing prior Board doctrine is Our
Way, Inc.,143 a case which presents a peculiar anomaly. All four members
of the Board agree that employees have the right to distribute union literature
and engage in union solicitation during non-work periods such as break or
mealtime.3 What they disagree about is how to inform the employees of
these rights.
242. On the issue of the duty to bargain during the contract term, see generally R. GORMAN,
supra note 4, at 455-66.
243. 268 N.L.R.B. 394 (1983).
244. Detailed discussion of the Board's distribution and solicitation rules are beyond the-
scope of this Article. For a thorough review, see R. GoRAN, supra note 4, at 179-94. See
also Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B.
828 (1943).
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Employers often promulgate rules providing that employees may not solicit
each other or distribute literature on working time or during working hours. 24
In 1974, the Board said, in Essex International, Inc., m that rules that restrict
solicitation and distribution during "working hours" are presumptively in-
valid, while rules that apply similar restrictions during "working time" are
presumptively valid.247 The Board's rationale was that "working hours"
connotes all the hours in the workday, but that employees would understand
"working time" to mean only those periods when they were actually engaged
in duties, and to exclude such non-work time as meals and breaks. 24 In
1981, however, the Board overruled Essex International in TRW, Inc.,249
saying that there was "no inherent meaningful distinction" between the two
terms and that both, without more explanation, were ambiguous and sus-
ceptible to misinterpretation by the employees. 20 In order to promulgate a
valid rule, the Board said employers needed "a clear statement that the
restriction on organizational activity contained in the rule does not apply
during break periods, meal periods, or other specified periods during the
workday when employees are properly not engaged in performing their work
tasks.' '251
In Our Way, the Board overruled TRW and returned to the standard of
Essex International. The Board criticized TRW as inconsistent with a long
line of precedent preserving the distinction between "working time" and
"working hours," which had been understood and relied on by unions and
employers in fashioning workplace rules. The Board concluded that the
rationale of TRW was not "compelling" and that the primary effect of the
case had been "a string of nonproductive litigation.' '252 Member Zimmerman
245. In Our Way, for example, the employer had rules that provided:
[Tlhe following are prohibited: ... Soliciting ... for any purpose during the
working time of the soliciting employee or the working time of the employee
being solicitated.
and:
SOLICITATION/DISTRIBUTION-In order to prevent disruption in the oper-
ation of the plant, interference with work and inconvenience to other employees,
solicitation for any cause, or distribution of literature of any kind, during working
time, is not permitted. Neither may an employee who is not on working time,
such as an employee who is on lunch or on break, solicit an employee who is on
working time for any cause or distribute literature of any kind to that person.
268 N.L.R.B. at 394.
246. 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974).
247. Id. at 750. The presumption of invalidity could be overcome if the employer could
show that the rule was "communicated or applied in such a way as to convey an intent clearly
to permit solicitation during breaktime or other periods when employees are not actively at
work." Id.
248. Id.
249. 257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981).
250. Id. at 443.
251. Id.
252. Our Way, 268 N.L.R.B. at 395.
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dissented, saying that his colleagues were engaged in "the folly of attempting
to draw useful distinctions between terms of equal ambiguity. "253
Although Our Way does not change the substantive rights of employees
(and is therefore probably less important than the Board's other recent cases)
it displays the difficulty of resolving behavioral issues in litigation. Neither
Our Way nor TRW is necessarily wrong. Whether the concept of "working
time" needs to be explained to employees, and whether they can differentiate
it from "working hours," is something the Board does not know and will
not learn through a case-by-case approach. Unfortunately, the Board has
shown a complete disdain for resolving behavioral issues based on anything
but its own "experience," which certainly does not include talking to em-
ployees about their perception of employer rules.
Although former member Pennello once chastised his colleagues for treat-
ing employees like "retarded children, ' ' 214 if the Board insists on deciding
cases based on its own behavioral assumptions, there is little reason for it
to assume that employees distinguish between "working time" and "working
hours." The Board has simply repeated its argument so many times that it
has convinced itself that the distinction has merit. It also may have caused
employers to promulgate rules in reliance on the distinction. What employers
think the Board means, however, is not the issue. The real question, left
unanswered in Our Way, is why employees, unfamiliar with Board vacil-
lation, will interpret a rule denying them the right to engage in concerted
activity during "working time" to exclude breaks and meal periods. The
standard of TRW, calculated only to resolve a possible ambiguity, ensures
that employees understand their rights and poses no significant burden to
employers who can easily modify their rules. The Board's retreat from TRW,
based on its unverified assumptions about employee perception, was un-
warranted.
V. CONSTRUCTIVE CONCERTED ACTIVITY
Meyers Industries
One of the more significant cases decided by the NLRB during the past
year was Meyers Industries,25 which narrowed considerably the Board's view
of concerted activity. At issue in Meyers was constructive concerted activity,
253. Id. at 397.
254. "I submit that under the guise of maintaining laboratory conditions we are treating
employees not like mature individuals capable of... making their own choices but as retarded
children who need to be protected at all costs." Medical Ancillary Services, 212 N.L.R.B. 582,
585 (1974) (Penello, dissenting).
255. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984). For a more detailed review of the issues raised by Meyers,
see Bethel, Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals From the
Court and the Board, 59 IND. L.J. 583 (1985). See also Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and
the Requirement of Concert Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. Rav. 286
(1981).
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the Board's label for activity engaged in by one employee that nonetheless
satisfies section 7's requirement of concert. 2 6 Interestingly, at about the same
time the Board abandoned one form of constructive concerted activity in
Meyers, the Supreme Court approved another form in NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems, Inc. 217 In City Disposal the Court said that action by a single
employee to enforce or claim the protection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment is concerted activity and therefore eligible for the protection of section
7. The Court reasoned that such conduct is simply an extension of the
concerted activity that gave rise to the labor contract in the first place. 28
There was no claim of protection under a collective bargaining agreement
in Meyers. Rather, the decision overruled a line of cases that found protests
by a single employee taken for the benefit of other workers to be concerted.
The constructive concerted activity case most often cited is Alleluia Cush-
ion Co. 219 In that case, an individual employee filed a complaint with a state
safety agency. Even though there was no evidence that other employees
shared the same concern, the Board noted the "vital interest" that employees
in general have in employment safety and, absent evidence to the contrary,
said it would presume that such complaints had the support of other em-
ployees. 260 The fiction of coemployee interest allowed the Board to circum-
vent the language of section 7, which protects "concerted activity for mutual
aid and protection." Unable to find real concerted action, the Board merely
"presumed" its way around the statutory language.
Constructive concerted activity was not limited to individual attempts to
enforce or preserve statutory rights, as had been the case in Alleluia Cushion.
The doctrine was soon extended to protect action taken "for the benefit
of" or "on behalf of" other employees, whether other employees joined in
the action or not.26' Although some of its decisions are hopelessly incon-
sistent, 262 all that was usually required to satisfy the concert requirement of
section 7 was a matter that could be presumed to be of mutual employee
concern.
263
256. Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), provides, in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... (emphasis added).
257. 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
258. Id. at 1510-14. The branch of constructive concerted activity approved by the Supreme
Court in City Disposal is popularly known as the Interboro Doctrine named after NLRB v.
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967), enforcing 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966).
259. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
260. Id. at 1000.
261. See, e.g., Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064, enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 256 (6th
Cir. 1979).
262. See, e.g., Capital Ornamental Concrete Specialties, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 851 (1980). See
also Bethel, supra note 255, at 607-08.
263. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 1288, enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 840(2d Cir. 1980); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350 (1978). See also Bethel, supra note 255,
at 587-90.
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Under the rationale of Alleluia Cushion and its progeny, the employee's
discharge in Meyers surely would have violated section 8(a)(1). The discharge
resulted from safety complaints about a truck and a subsequent refusal to
drive it based on the employee's fear of defective brakes. No other employee
joined in the safety complaints, and no one voiced support for the discharged
employee's refusal to drive.2 4 Previously, however, another employee had
claimed that he would no longer drive the truck because of its unsafe
condition. 261
For the Board majority, the case was not complicated: section 7 requires
concerted action, and one employee acting alone cannot, by definition, act
in concert. 26 The majority criticized Alleluia Cushion as having presumed
group interest simply to protect protests over matters that the Board thought
should have been of concern to a group. 267 In overruling Alleluia Cushion,
the Board adopted an "objective" standard that finds concerted action only
when an employee acts "with or on the authority of other employees. ' 261
The narrowness of the Board's new rule is demonstrated by Traylor-
Pamco,269 a case cited with approval in Meyers. In Traylor-Pamco, the Board
concluded that two employees who refused to eat lunch in a sewer were
engaged in individual, not concerted, activity. The ALJ had found that
although both employees took the same action at the same time, their conduct
was not concerted because neither had consulted with or relied on the other. 270
The Board ignored the fact that one week earlier, all of the employees had
refused to eat in the sewer and that, only the day before the discharge, all
employees delayed the beginning of work over the same dispute. 271 Although
not as extreme, similar facts existed in Meyers. When the discharged employee
refused to drive the truck, he was aware that another employee had recently
taken similar action. Nonetheless, the Board said that section 7 required
purposeful concerted activity and that "individual employee concern, even
if openly manifested by several employees on an individual basis, is not
sufficient.' '272
If one considers only the literal language of the statute, it is not easy to
quarrel with the Board's argument. The statute expressly protects concerted
activity and, therefore, seems to exclude from its scope action taken by
individuals. Moreover, an analysis that restricts protection to concerted ac-
tivity is justified by the policy of the Act. The goal of the NLRA is to allow
employees, if they choose to do so, to combine their power and designate
264. Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 498.
265. Id. at 497.
266. Id. at 494.
267. Id. at 495.
268. Id. at 496-97.
269. 154 N.L.R.B. 380 (1965).
270. Id. at 388.
271. Id. at 385.
272. Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 498 (emphasis original).
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a representative to present their concerns to management. Selfish action by
individual workers is not only not "concerted" in the literal sense, but it is
also unlikely to spawn the kinds of employee organizational efforts that the
Act was intended to foster. 2
73
Even so, the new objective test is needlessly rigid. Although the Board
refused to acknowledge the difference in Meyers, the facts of Traylor-Pamco
are a long way from those at issue in Alleluia Cushion. In Alleluia Cushion
and the cases that followed, the Board protected activity that it thought
ought to be protected, regardless of employee concern. Unable to find real
concert of action, the Board simply made it up. Alleluia Cushion had pushed
the theory of constructive concerted activity too far and should have been
overruled. In a case like Traylor-Pamco and, for that matter, Meyers, the
Board did not have to "presume" the common interests of employees.
Objective evidence of that interest was present, and protecting activity that
manifests that concern falls within the policy of section 7. The Board's
decision in Meyers places undue emphasis on form and leaves employees
vulnerable to employer retaliation for expressing concerns that are, in fact
rather than in fiction, shared by co-workers.
VI. EmPLoYEE INTERROGATION
Rossmore House
The Board has consistently interpreted section 8(a)(1) to bar employers
from coercively interrogating employees concerning their union sympathies,
reasoning that such questioning prejudices the free exercise of section 7
rights. 274 The Board's members have sometimes differed, however, about
what constitutes the interference, restraint, or coercion banned by the Act,
particularly when the employee's support for the union is open and known
to the employer. In Rossmore House,275 the Board announced that it would
apply a totality of the circumstances test to such interrogation and, in the
process, overruled its previous decision in PPG Industries.27 6 In PPG, the
employer had directed inquiries to employees known to be union adherents;
this activity, the Board said, violated section 8(a)(1):
We have recently held ... that inquiries of this nature constitute probing
into employees' union sentiments which, even when addressed to em-
ployees who have openly declared their union adherence, reasonably tend
273. See Bethel, supra note 255, at 604-06.
274. See, e.g., Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967); Blue Flash Express, Inc.,
109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954). See also NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1965); R.
GoRm AN, supra note 4, at 173-77.
275. 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984).
276. 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980). Also overruled were Anaconda Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 1091
(1979); Paceco, 237 N.L.R.B. 399 (1978); ITT Automotive Elec. Prods. Div., 231 N.L.R.B.
878 (1977). Rossmore, 269 N.L.R.B. at 1176 n.3.
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to coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. We have
further found such probing to be coercive even in the absence of threats
of reprisals or promises of benefits. The type of questioning at issue
conveys an employer's displeasure with employees' union activity and
thereby discourages such activity in the future. The coercive impact of
these questions is not diminished by the employees' open union support
or by the absence of attendant threats.2"
The facts at issue in Rossmore clearly violated the PPG standard. The
union sent the employer a letter informing him that two employees were
forming an organizing committee. The manager approached one of the
employees and asked about the letter.278 Later, the owner asked the same
employee why he was interested in the union.279 Under PPG, both instances
of interrogation violated section 8(a)(1), notwithstanding the employer's
knowledge of the employee's union sympathies and notwithstanding the lack
of any other acts of interference or coercion.20 In overruling PPG, the Board
said it would not look at interrogation in isolation, but would consider
"whether under all the circumstances the interrogation reasonably tends to
restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act. ' 281
In a vigorous dissent, Member Zimmerman charged that it was the Ross-
more majority, and not PPG, that had created a per se rule. Zimmerman
said that the majority had promulgated a rule that gave no weight to the
setting and nature of the interrogation and that it would find an interrogation
unlawful only if accompanied by an unlawful threat or promise.2 2 Con-
versely, he characterized PPG as a decision calculated to consider specific
factual circumstances. 283
Zimmerman's interpretation, however, is not supported by the cases. The
Rossmore majority did say it overruled PPG and other cases "to the extent
they find that an employer's questioning open and active union supporters
about their union sentiments, in the absence of threats or promises,"28 4 to
violate section 8(a)(1). That choice of language, however, appears to have
been influenced by the PPG opinion, which said that such interrogation was
coercive "even in the absence of threats of reprisals or promises of bene-
fits."2 5 More importantly, the Board used the terms "totality of the
277. PPG, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1147 (footnotes omitted).
278. There was conflicting testimony concerning the extent of this conversation. Rossmore,
269 N.L.R.B. at 1176. However, the Board concluded that there would be no violation under
either version of the conversation. Id. at 1178.
279. Id. at 1176.
280. The AL in Rossmore recommended a violation, relying principally on Paceco, 237
N.L.R.B. 399 (1978). 269 N.L.R.B. at 1176 n.3.
281. Rossmore, 269 N.L.R.B. at 1178 n.20. The Board characterized PPG as establishing
'
4a per se rule that completely disregards the circumstances surrounding an alleged interrogation
and ignores the reality of the workplace." Id. at 1177.
282. Id. at 1178.
283. Id. at 1179.
284. Id. at 1177 (emphasis added).
285. PPG, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1147.
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circumstances ' 286 and "all the circumstances ' 28 7 to characterize its new test
and, in response to Zimmerman's charge, detailed the factors it will con-
sider.288 Moreover, Zimmerman's assertion that PPG was based on factual
analysis is simply wrong. The Board did list the facts in PPG, but then
seemed completely oblivious to them, setting forth a list of conclusions in
only one paragraph of "analysis. ' 219 The Board did not explain why the
interrogation in PPG was coercive or why the coercive impact of employer
interrogation was not diminished when the employees being interrogated
were already known to be union adherents. The PPG majority did nothing
more than establish a per se rule finding unlawful any employer questioning
of employees concerning their union sympathies.
Analysis of a decision like Rossmore is difficult. The Board's recent
decisions favor management so strongly that an opinion allowing interro-
gation of union sympathizers obviously produces some skepticism. None-
theless, this Board panel is not the first to apply an "all the circumstances"
test to employer interrogation, nor was the doctrine overruled by Rossmore
of particularly long standing. 290 Although the Board's behavioral assumptions
have produced significant criticism, it is reasonable for it to conclude that
casual questioning directed to a known union adherent, devoid of coercive
circumstances, poses no danger to the free exercise of section 7 rights. While
union organizing drives often produce considerable rancor between man-
agement and workers, the relationship is not always hostile. All the Board
has said is that questions concerning union sympathies are not necessarily
coercive when directed to employees whose sympathies are already known.29'
On its face, that position is considerably easier to defend than the previous
conclusion that such interrogation is always coercive.
The real question raised by Rossmore is not what the Board said or did
in that case. Rather, the Board's rule (and its bias) will be judged on
subsequent cases that establish what circumstances are necessary to make an
interrogation coercive. The more tolerant the Board is of interrogation, and
286. Rossmore, 269 N.L.R.B. at 1178.
287. Id. at 1177.
288. Id. at 1178 n.20:
Some factors which may be considered in analyzing alleged interrogation are: (1)
the background; (2) the nature of the information sought; (3) the identity of the
questioner; and (4) the place and method of interrogation .... These and other
relevant factors are not to be mechanically applied in each case. Rather, they
represent some areas of inquiry that may be considered in applying the Blue Flash
test of whether under all the circumstances the interrogation reasonably tends to
restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.
289. PPG, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1147.
290. As recently as 1974, the Board held, in Stumpf Motor Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 431 (1974),
that questioning of a known union adherent did not violate § 8(a)(1). See also B.F. Goodrich
Footwear Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 353 (1973).
291. Although the facts at issue in Rossmore involved a known union adherent, it is probable
that the Board will apply the "all the circumstances" test to other forms of interrogation as
well.
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the harder it strives to make it "casual," the less credibility Rossmore will
enjoy.
VII. REINSTATEMENT AFTER STRIKE MISCONDUCT
Clear Pine Mouldings
In Clear Pine Mouldings,292 the Board adopted a new standard governing
the reinstatement of employees who engage in strike misconduct. At issue
was the conduct of two employees during an unfair labor practice strike. 293
One of the employees (Sittser) had made numerous verbal threats to co-
workers. 2 4 The other employee (Anderson) carried a club on the picket line
(as did many other pickets) and used it to beat on the vehicles of nonstrikers
crossing the picket line.295 In addition, after being knocked down, but while
still holding the club, Anderson threatened to kill a nonstriker. 296
Although acknowledging that the two employees had engaged in miscon-
duct, the administrative law judge recommended reinstatement for both,
finding neither incident serious enough to warrant discharge. He discounted
Sittser's verbal threats because they were "unaccompanied by action and
did not recur" and similarly excused Anderson's conduct as mere " 'animal
exuberance' which the Board excuses." 297 Although reasonable minds can
differ concerning the extend of misconduct necessary to meet its standards,
the ALJ's recommendation seemed justified under NLRB precedent. The
Board has frequently said that verbal threats, unaccompanied by any physical
action or gestures, are not serious strike misconduct.28 Moreover, the Board
has acknowledged that strikes produce strong emotion, that strikers are not
expected to observe "the rules of the parlor," and that some "exuberance"
is to be expected, and tolerated, during a strike.29
In Clear Pine Mouldings, however, the Board narrowed considerably the
range of allowable behavior. The entire Board rejected the notion that words
292. 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984) (supplementing 238 N.L.R.B. 69).
293. An unfair labor practice strike, as the name implies, is undertaken to protest an
employer's unfair labor practices. For a general discussion, see R. GoRMaN, supra note 4, at
339-43.
294. In one incident, an employee who had been confronted by a group and shoved was
told by Sittser that the striking employees might bum his house. Sittser later repeated the threat
by telephone. Sittser also told an employee that some employees might get their hands broken.
The same employee overheard Sittser telephone a union representative and suggest a visit to a
nonstriker's house to "straighten him out." Finally, the Board found that Sittser stopped the
car of a nonstriker to tell her that she was taking her life in her own hands and would live
to regret it. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1044-45.
295. There was testimony that Anderson hit at least three different vehicles and also swung
at a motorcyclist. Id. at 1045.
296. Id.
297. 268 N.L.R.B. at 1045.
298. See, e.g., Coronet Casuals, 207 N.L.R.B. 304, 305 (1973), and cases cited therein.
299. Id.
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alone, unaccompanied by physical acts or gestures, can never warrant a
denial of reinstatement. Instead, the Board adopted the test promulgated by
the Third Circuit in NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc.30 In that case, the
Court said that employers did not have to tolerate "conduct that amounts
to intimidation and threats of bodily harm." Quoting a previous opinion,
the court also said the test should be "whether the misconduct is such that,
under the circumstances existing, it may reasonably tend to coerce or intim-
idate employees in the exercise of rights protected under the Act.''301 Al-
though the Board adopted the McQuaide test, it split evenly on its rationale
for doing so.
Citing evidence that Congress was concerned about picketline violence
when it adopted the Taft-Hartley Amendments, Chairman Dotson and Mem-
ber Hunter quoted broadly from the Supreme Court's opinion in Fansteel
Metalurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 02 where the employee misconduct had been
considerably more egregious.303 They emphasized a passage which indicates
that employees have no right to engage in "unlawful acts in order to force
compliance with demands" 3°4 and quoted language proclaiming that the Act
was designed to foster peaceful settlements of disputes, not a "resort to
force and violence. '305
Although Hunter and Dotson purport to have adopted the McQuaide
"under the circumstances" test, their opinion indicates that their view is
considerably narrower:
We believe it appropriate . . to state our view that the existence of a
'strike' . . . does not in any way privilege [strikers] to engage in other
than peaceful picketing and persuasion. They have no right ... to
threaten those employees who ... work during the strike, to block access
to the employer's premises, and certainly no right to carry or use weap-
ons .... As we view the statute, the only activity the statute privileges
in this context, other than peaceful patrolling, is the nonthreatening
expression of opinion, verbally or through signs and pamphleteering,
similar to that found in Section 8(c).10
Rather than adopting a rule which would determine whether a striker's
words are coercive in the context of surrounding circumstances, Dotson and
Hunter appear to opt for a virtual per se rule that any threat warrants a
denial of reinstatement. Thus, they stress that strikers have only the right
to patrol peacefully and express opinions in a non-threatening manner, using
as a model for threatening speech the standards applied by the Board under
300. 552 F.2d 519, 527 (3d Cir. 1977). See Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1045-46,
1048 (Zimmerman and Dennis, concurring).
301. W.C. McQuaide, 552 F.2d at 528 (quoting Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers
v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 580, 582-83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964)).
302. 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
303. In Fansteel, the employees had forceably seized the employer's plant.
304. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046 (quoting Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 253).
305. 268 N.L.R.B. at 1047 (quoting Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 257-58).
306. 268 N.L.R.B. at 1047.
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section 8(c).107 As applied to employer speech, that section sometimes finds
implied threats in communication that seems innocuous on its face."' If the
same standard applies to employee picket line speech, not only will an express
threat cause a denial of reinstatement (regardless of the circumstances), but
also employees who say anything at all risk the consequence that the Board
will find an implicit threat in their speech.309
In a separate opinion, Members Zimmerman and Dennis concurred in the
adoption of the McQuaide test, but expressly rejected their colleagues' anal-
ysis of "the right to strike, section 8(c) of the Act, and the legislative history
of the Act."310 Rather than adopt the Dotson-Hunter rationale, Zimmerman
and Dennis said "the common question is whether the particular strike
misconduct 'in the circumstances reasonably tends to coerce or intimi-
date.' "I" Unlike Dotson and Hunter, Zimmerman and Dennis appear to
believe that not every verbal threat justifies a refusal to reinstate, but that
a threat need not' be accompanied by physical acts or gestures in order to
warrant that result.312 In short, Zimmerman and Dennis appear willing to
307. See, e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786 (1962):
While these comments may appear to be mere statements of the Employer's legal
rights and his intention to adhere to them, in the present context they assume
quite a different character. The statement that the Employer could not be com-
pelled to sign a contract in the absence of agreement seems innocuous on the
surface. But when the same sentence was completed by pointing out the probability
of a strike, when the entire sentence followed immediately after the threat to
abrogate existing benefits and, in effect, bargain "from scratch," and when it
was succeeded by the graphic description of the results of their replacement during
the predicted strike, the entire import and impact of the comment was changed
to a clear message that the Employer would not sign a contract even if required
to negotiate. This message was reinforced by the other statements noted above,
particularly the Employer's position that it would not change its wage policy,
undeniably it was thus announcing a predetermination not to bargain on the
subject of wages.
308. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982) provides, in part:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion ... shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if such expression contains no threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
309. During a panel discussion at the 1984 Midwest Labor Law Conference in Columbus,
Ohio, on Oct. 15, 1984, in response to this assertion by the author, Chairman Dotson denied
that the plurality opinion created a per se rule that would find any verbal threat to warrant a
denial of reinstatement. Instead, he professed allegience to the McQuaide "all the circumstances"
test. There is nothing in the language quoted supra text accompanying note 306, however, to
suggest any such approach. The Chairman's opinion says that the statute privileges "only"
non-threatening speech and picketing. Unless the opinion means that an apparent threat might
not, considering "all the circumstances," actually be a threat (an interpretation not suggested
by the language used), it appears that any verbal threat could justify a denial of reinstatement,
regardless of its setting.
310. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1049.
311. Id. (quoting Associated Groceries v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333, 1337 (1st Cir. 1977)).
312. Dennis and Zimmerman said their adoption of the McQuaide test was based on the
rationale of that opinion. In McQuaide, the Board had applied its typical test that verbal
threats, unaccompanied by physical acts or gestures, could not warrant a denial of reinstatement.
Rejecting that test, the court adknowledged that some strike confrontations "are inevitable and
... not every impropriety is grounds for discharge." 552 F.2d at 527. However, the court
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consider the threat in its context, perhaps discounting isolated incidents or
those unlikely to have a coercive impact, while Hunter and Dotson are
satisfied that any threat should preclude reinstatement.
Not only did Clear Pine Mouldings adopt new standards of deportment
for strikers, it also appears to reject another long-standing doctrine. Tra-
ditionally, the Board has applied different standards to picket line misconduct
depending on whether the employees involved are economic or unfair labor
practice strikers." 3 Although, in theory, the Board cannot excuse misconduct
in either situation, as the First Circuit explained in NLRB v. Thayer Co.,314
even if picket line misconduct is severe enough to preclude reinstatement for
economic strikers, the Board has the discretion to reinstate unfair labor
practice strikers as part of its remedy for the unfair labor practice that
caused the strike in the first place. 315 As stated by the Dotson-Hunter opinion
in Clear Pine Mouldings, "the Board has .. .balanced the severity of the
employer's unfair labor practices that provoked the strike against the gravity
of the striker's misconduct. '316
Dotson and Hunter flatly reject any such balancing test, noting that the
statute does not authorize employees to engage in misconduct "in proportion
to their individual estimates of the degree of seriousness of an employer's
unfair labor practices.' '317 They said that the Thayer approach condones
employee violence as an appropriate response to employer unfair labor
practices, and perhaps promotes further retaliation from the employer. They
also rejected the balancing approach because of the ambiguity it creates: "It
would be virtually impossible ... for employees to know what is expected
of them during a strike because balancing remains elusive .... ,,3 8Rather
than subject the employees to the uncertainties of interest balancing, then,
Dotson and Hunter graciously promulgate a rule that denies them reinstate-
wrote:
[W]e do not believe that an employer must countenance conduct that amounts
to intimidation and threats of bodily harm .... [W]e fail to see how a threat
acquires protected status because it is unaccompanied by physical acts or gestures.
The question is whether a threat is sufficiently egregious not whether there is
added emphasis.
Id. In making that determination, the court applied an objective test:
... whether the misconduct is such that under the circumstances existing, it may
reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected
under the Act.
Id. at 528 (quoting Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850,
852-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964)).
313. For the distinction between economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers, see R.
GoRMAN, supra note 4, at 339-41.
314. 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954).
315. In addition to Thayer, see R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 349-50. The Board adapted
the Thayer rationale in Blades Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 561 (1963), enforcement denied, 344
F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965).
316. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1047.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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ment for any act of misconduct, no matter how serious or provoking the
employer's unfair labor practices.
It is not entirely clear whether Members Dennis and Zimmerman joined
in the repudiation of interest balancing. Their opinion indicates that some
threats might not warrant a denial of reinstatement, but that indication alone
is not determinative. The real issue is whether a threat that might otherwise
preclude reinstatement should nonetheless be ignored in view of the severity
of the employer's conduct. The Zimmerman-Dennis opinion is silent on that
score. But after detailing their disagreement with their colleagues, a footnote
at the close of the opinion says "in all other respects we agree with Chairman
Dotson and Member Hunter."3 19 The inference would be strong that included
in the "other respects" is the repudiation of Thayer, except that Zimmerman
and Dennis cite Thayer as authority that reinstatement of the two employees
in Clear Pine Mouldings "would not effectuate the policies of the Act. '" 32°
Presumably, then, they balanced the severity of the employees' misconduct
against the gravity of the employer's misconduct and found that the rein-
statement was not warranted. Given their citation of Thayer, one should
assume that it retains life, although it may be gasping.
Analysis of Clear Pine Mouldings is not easy, because the configuration
of the opinions produces considerable doubt about what the Board actually
decided. It obviously discarded the rule that verbal threats unaccompanied
by physical acts never warrant denial of reinstatement. Dotson and Hunter
appear to have adopted the equally objectionable rule that verbal threats
always warrant such denial, regardless of their setting. The Zimmerman-
Dennis interpretation, which appears to be an "all the circumstances" test,
makes considerably more sense. There is no reason for the Board to abandon
its long-standing view that strikes are not necessarily orderly affairs carried
on with the civility of an afternoon tea. Although it should not countenance
violence, prior decisions recognized that employees sometimes react to a
strike with considerable emotion and, while such actions are not always
prudent, they do not necessarily restrain the section 7 rights of other em-
ployees.321 The Dotson-Hunter opinion is a pious pronouncement that em-
ployees must deport themselves as ladies and gentlemen or risk the loss of
the job that created the emotion in the first place. The Zimmerman-Dennis
approach, which places employee action in context, is much more realistic.
As Zimmerman said in Clear Pine Mouldings:
The Board's application of the McQuaide test of coercive tendency must
be influenced by the knowledge that picketline actions often include tense,
angry and hostile confrontations in which emotions run high and threats
are hurled that cannot reasonably be interpreted as auguries.of violence.
319. Id. at 1049 n.7.
320. Id. at 1049. In addition, Zimmerman and Dennis cite Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568
F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1978), which applied the same test.
321. See, e.g., NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d at 528; Coronet Casuals, 207
N.L.R.B. 304, 305 (1973).
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The Board must take care not to impose on industrial disputes a code
of ethics alien to the realities of confrontational strikes and picketlines
contrary to our national tradition of free speech. 32
Equally objectionable to their per se test for the existence of misconduct
is the Dotson-Hunter repudiation of the Thayer balancing test. Taken to-
gether, the two decisions are not surprising. The same rigidity that ignores
the context of an employee's speech also precludes a comparison between
employee and employer wrongdoing. The Dotson-Hunter explanation for its
rejection of Thayer is a distortion of reality. The portions of the opinion
quoted earlier imply that employees plan a course of strike misconduct in
direct response to their perception of employer wrongdoing. It ignores the
possibility that some picket line misconduct might occur spontaneously as an
emotional reaction to egregious employer unfair labor practices. When that
happens, Thayer allows the Board to consider whether the employees' action
was serious enough to deny reinstatement in light of the gravity of the
employer's offenses. Far from encouraging employee misconduct, the Thayer
standard allows the imposition of more severe remedies against employers
which are calculated to deter their lawlessness. 32 Thayer, therefore, gives
the Board the ability to protect the rights of employees while still retaining
the discretion to sanction wrongdoing. It should not be abandoned.
CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, each of these decisions has produced considerable
criticism and their combined effect has prompted serious allegations con-
cerning both the Board's effectiveness and its institutional stature. It is not
surprising that Board decisions, particularly those that reverse prior doctrine,
evoke strong feelings. Historically, issues concerning the right of employees
to organize, the role of the unions in decision making and the resulting
limitation on managerial authority have provoked strong emotion and have
often caused conflict among the interested parties. Those affected by NLRB
decisions that change the balance of power can hardly be expected to view
the Board's action dispassionately. Whatever may be the case in other areas,
labor law produces few neutrals.
The fact that the Board's recent decisions favor management does not,
however, justify the near-hysteria the decisions have generated. The accu-
sations made by a recent congressional committee, for example, do little
more than prompt equally passionate responses, thereby hardening the at-
322. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1048 n.2.
323. As explained by the D.C. Circuit in Local 833, UAW v. NLRB (Kohler Co.), 300 F.2d
699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962), "reinstatement is the only sanction which
prevents an employer from benefiting from his unfair labor practice through discharge which
may weaken or destroy the union." 300 F.2d at 703.
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titudes of each side and diverting attention away from the important policy
issues at stake. 24
The fact is that while the current Board majority is obviously more
conservative than previous panels, nothing in its leading decisions warrants
the frequent charge that it is insensitive to employee rights and responsive
only to employer interests. Olin and United Technologies, the two arbitration
deferral cases, do not even concern matters that ought to divide labor and
management. Each side has gained much from labor arbitration and has
much more to gain. Although United Technologies is an unfortunate decision
that relegates employees to contractual, rather than statutory procedures, it
does not derogate either the status or the power of the union. Moreover,
Olin, which promises renewed acceptance of labor arbitration awards by the
Board, substitutes the processes of collective bargaining for the intrusive
power of the government, thereby enhancing the importance of the union.
In addition, Gourmet Foods should not be viewed as merely a pro-
management decision. Prior to Gourmet Foods, the Board had only vol-
untarily issued one Gissel-I order. If the Board's recent decision hurts labor,
it is not much worse off under this panel than it was before. More impor-
tantly, the power of the Board to issue bargaining orders without a showing
of majority status has divided both Board members and courts for some
time. It is, therefore, foolish to suddenly focus attention of that debate
solely on this panel, pretending that the controversy had somehow abated
following the Board's Conair decision.
Even more controversial cases, like Otis Elevator, Milwaukee Springs (II),
and Meyers, do not warrant a conclusion that the Board's decisions are
unprincipled. Milwaukee Springs (I) was a novel and highly controversial
decision that faced an uncertain future in the Seventh Circuit. The range of
bargainable subjects, at issue in Otis, has been the source of continuing
debate for many years. Although it narrows the range of bargainable subjects,
Otis was decided, in large part, in response to the Supreme Court's decision
in First National Maintenance. Meyers also was prompted, in part, by judicial
criticism. No circuit court of appeals had ever accepted the Alleluia Cushion
theory of constructive concerted activity and there was no reason to believe
that continued perserverance by the Board would overcome that intransig-
ence.
324. See Suacom. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE Comm. ON EDUC. AND
LABOR, 98T CoNo., 2D SEss., THE F~i uRE OF LABOR LAw-A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
WoRKERs (Comm. Print 1984). The report begins by stating that "[l]abor law has failed," id.
at 1, and lays much of the blame at the door of the Reagan Board. Id. at 14-23. Although a
detailed review of the report is beyond the scope of this article, there is scant authority to
support its conclusion that the Act now discourages, rather than encourages, collective bar-
gaining, id. at 23, or that the significant decline in private sector union membership can be
traced to Board decisions. Id. For an equally passionate response, see J. Irving, "Failure" of
the Labor Laws: An Election Year Issue (unpublished manuscript of a speech by the former
General Counsel of the NLRB, presented to the Midwest Labor Law Conference on Oct. 15,
1984) (copy on file with author).
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This summary is not intended as a justification of the Board's recent
decisions or of the labor philosophy they symbolize. The review of the
opinions should indicate that. It does suggest, however, that the actions of
this Board do not differ significantly from the records of prior panels. These
cases show only that the Reagan Board has implemented a conservative
philosophy in volatile areas. No one doubts that the decisions discussed here
will, someday, be reversed by a more "liberal" Board, thereby prompting
outcries from management similar to those now heard from labor. That
process may produce indecision among practitioners and invite cynicism from
those affected. Such problems have haunted the NLRB since its inception
and no panel has shown a willingness to temper the situation by rulemaking.
Whatever the implications of the problems, they are not novel to this Board
and they do not establish intellectual deceit.
